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IS THE "DARLING" IN DANGER?
"VOID FOR VAGUENESS"-THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE RICO
PATTERN REQUIREMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
In the twenty years following its birth as the "new darling of the
prosecutor's nursery,"' the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations Act (RICO)2 has matured into the most versatile and potent
weapon ever devised to deal with enterprise criminality.3 Now, on its
twenty-first birthday, droves of attorneys representing defendants and
business associations throughout the nation are relentlessly seeking to
have RICO struck down in its prime.4
1. Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L.
REV. 165, 165 (1980). The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. 111990) (Title IX of the Organ-
ized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922), was dubbed
the "new darling of the prosecutor's nursery" in reference to the advantages
that it affords prosecutors in comparison to other available criminal statutes. See
Tarlow, supra, at 167-70. RICO has usurped the place formerly held by the body
of conspiracy laws which Judge Learned Hand had years before referred to as
"that darling of the modem prosecutor's nursery" because of the ease with
which prosecutors could join numerous defendants in one trial and obtain con-
victions supported by weak circumstantial evidence. See id. at 167-68 (quoting
Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925)).
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
3. Professor G. Robert Blakey, one of the drafters of RICO, described "en-
terprise criminality" as encompassing "all types of organized criminal behavior
... from simple political corruption to sophisticated white-collar crime schemes
to traditional Mafia-type endeavors." Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP.
L.Q. 1009, 1013-14 (1980). RICO broadly defines "enterprise" as "includ[ing]
any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and
any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity."
18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988).
4. In addition to the American Bar Association, other organizations that
have petitioned Congress to amend RICO include: the National Association of
Manufacturers, the American Civil Liberties Union, the United States Chamber
of Commerce, the AFL-CIO, the American Institute of Certified Public Account-
ants, the Securities Industry Association, the American Bankers Association, the
Independent Bankers Association of America, the Future Industries Association,
the American Council of Life Insurance, the Credit Union National Association,
the Grocery Manufacturers of America, the National Automobile Dealers Associ-
ation, the State Farm Insurance Companies, the Alliance of American Insurers
and the American Financial Services Association. Hughes, RICO Reform: How
Much Is Needed?, 43 VAND. L. REV. 639, 640 (1990). In contrast, organizations
that oppose any drastic change to RICO, include: the Public Citizen-Congress
Watch, the United States Public Interest Research Group, the National Associa-
tion of Attorneys General, the National District Attorneys Association, the Na-
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RICO proscribes engagement in "a pattern of racketeering activity"
or the "collection of an unlawful debt." 5 The statute has both civil and
criminal applications 6 with differing burdens of proof.7 RICO precisely
tional Association of Insurance Commissioners and the North American
Securities Administration Association. Id.
Professor Blakey vigorously opposes the present proposals to "reform"
RICO. See Blakey & Perry, An Analysis of the Myths That Bolster Efforts to Rewrite
RICO and the Various Proposals for Reform: "Mother of God-Is This the End of
RICO?", 43 VAND. L. REv. 851, 979-82, 986-87 (1990). Although he opposes the
proposals presently being considered, Professor Blakey concedes that carefully
drafted amendments could be beneficial in strengthening RICO and protecting
against abuse of the statute. RICO Reform: Hearings on H.R. 2517, H.R. 2943,
H.R. 4892, H.R. 5290, H.R. 5391, and H.R. 5445 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 1498-500(1987) (statement of Prof. G. Robert Blakey).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1962-1964 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990). Section 1962 states in
pertinent part:(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any in-
come derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity or through collection of an unlawful debt ... to use or invest,
directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such
income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or opera-
tion of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which
affect, interstate or foreign commerce....
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racke-
teering, activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or
maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enter-
riSe which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
reign commerce.(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, inter-
state or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indi-
rectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any
of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
Id. § 1962.
6. Private citizens can bring civil RICO actions to recover treble damages
and the cost of the suit, including reasonable attorneys' fees, for injuries to their
business or property resulting from violations of the statute. Id. § 1964(c). The
government can also bring civil RICO actions seeking equitable relief such as
restraining orders or injunctions. Id. § 1964(b). Other civil penalties that may
be ordered by the court are divestiture by the RICO violator of any interest in
the criminal enterprise and dissolution or reorganization of the enterprise. Id.
§ 1964(a).
The government can bring criminal RICO actions seeking forfeiture of any
interest acquired or maintained in violation of the statute, fines, and imprison-
ment for up to 20 years (or for life, if the maximum penalty for an underlying
predicate offense so provides). Id. § 1963(a).
7. The standard of proof for all criminal prosecutions, including those
under RICO, is constitutionally mandated as "beyond a reasonable doubt." In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("[Trhe Due Process Clause protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged."). Thus, a
successful criminal prosecution under RICO requires both that underlying pred-
icate acts and the existence of a pattern of racketeering activity be proved be-
2
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defines "racketeering activity" to encompass enumerated "predicate
yond a reasonable doubt. Id. The ABA Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force has
urged that the required predicate offenses in civil RICO actions also be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. REPORT OF THE AD Hoc CIVIL RICO TASK FORCE OF
THE ABA SECTION OF CORPORATION, BANKING AND BUSINESS LAW 384 (1985)
[hereinafter ABA CIVL RICO REPORT]. Those lower courts that initially ad-
dressed the standard of proof issue in civil RICO actions, however, adopted a
"preponderance of the evidence" standard. See, e.g., United States v. Cappetto,
502 F.2d 1351, 1357-58 (7th Cir. 1974) (preponderance standard applied in
government suit to obtain preliminary injunction to stop illegal gambling), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476, 490 (E.D. Pa.
1983) (preponderance standard applied in private suit alleging fraudulent secur-
ities transactions); Eaby v. Richmond, 561 F. Supp. 131, 133-34 (E.D. Pa. 1983)
(preponderance standard applied in private suit alleging mail fraud in sale of
mineral rights); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp.
673, 676-77 (N.D. Ind. 1982) (preponderance Standard applied in private suit to
recoup damages for fraudulent insurance claim involving arson); Heinold Com-
modities, Inc. v. McCarty, 513 F. Supp. 311, 313-14 (N.D. 111. 1979) (preponder-
ance standard applied in private suit for losses in commodities trading); Farmers
Bank of Del. v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278, 1280 (D. Del. 1978)
(preponderance standard applied in private suit alleging violations of securities
laws); United States v. Ladmer, 429 F. Supp. 1231, 1243 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (pre-
ponderance standard applied in government suit alleging embezzlement of
union funds by union officers); United States v. Winstead, 421 F. Supp. 295, 296
(N.D. 11. 1976) (preponderance standard applied in government suit to obtain
temporary restraining order to stop illegal gambling). The preponderance stan-
dard requires "evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the
evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole
shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not." BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 1182 (6th ed. 1990).
In a 1985 decision, the Supreme Court discussed, but did not rule on, the
appropriate standard of proof in civil RICO actions. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Im-
rex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 491 (1985). In Sedima, the Court stated that it was "not at
all convinced that the predicate acts must be established beyond a reasonable
doubt" in civil RICO actions. Id. The Court noted that under a number of stat-
utes other than RICO, "conduct that can be punished as criminal only upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt will support civil sanctions under a preponder-
ance standard." Id. Consequently, those lower courts that have addressed the
issue after Sedima have continued to adhere to the preponderance standard in
civil RICO suits. See, e.g., Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1303 (7th
Cir. 1987) (preponderance standard applied in suit alleging conversion and
breach of fiduciary duties), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 917 (1989); Wilcox v. First Inter-
state Bank, N.A., 815 F.2d 522, 531-32 (9th Cir. 1987) (preponderance standard
applied in antitrust suit brought by borrowers against lender for imposition of
fraudulent interest rates); Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 731 (2d Cir.) (pre-
ponderance standard applied in suit alleging that local government employers
engaged in improper coercion of political contributions from employees and job
applicants under threat of adverse employment actions), cert. denied, 483 U.S.
1021 (1987); United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267,
279 n.12 (3d Cir. 1985) (preponderance standard applied in government civil
suit alleging murder and extortion by union officers), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140
(1986); Ford Motor Co. v. B & H Supply, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 975, 1001 (D. Minn.
1986) (preponderance standard applied in suit alleging fraudulent sale of coun-
terfeit auto parts); Bosteve, Ltd. v. Marauszwski, 642 F. Supp. 197, 202 n.7
(E.D.N.Y. 1986) (preponderance standard applied in suit alleging failure to pay
state sales tax).
A bill that would alter the burden of proof in civil RICO cases is presently
3
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acts" ranging from murder to mail fraud.8 The statute's definition of
"pattern," however, is less precise.9 This lack of precision in defining
RICO's "pattern requirement" has led to the present challenge to
RICO's constitutionality.
In H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 10 Justice Scalia invited
defendants to challenge RICO's constitutionality on the ground that the
statute's pattern requirement is unconstitutionally vague.1 In his con-
curring opinion, Justice Scalia professed frustration with attempts to as-
certain the meaning of the pattern requirement, stating: "That the
highest Court in the land has been unable to derive from this statute
anything more than today's meager guidance bodes ill for the day when
pending in the House of Representatives. See H.R. 1717, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 6 (1991). House Bill 1717 would require "clear and convincing" evidence of
civil RICO violations. Id. The Supreme Court has noted that the clear and con-
vincing standard of evidence "require[s] a plaintiff to prove his case to a higher
probability than is required by the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard."
See California ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Bros.' Santa Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90, 93
n.6 (1981). The Court has also noted that there is no single "precise verbal
formulation" of this standard. Id.
Commentators are doubtful that House Bill No. 1717 will ever be enacted
into law. See, e.g., DAILY REP. FOR EXECIrrVES, Jan. 17, 1992, at S14 ("RICO
reform bills have had a tough time getting through the House and Senate. It
does not appear that it will get any easier [for Bill 1717] in 1992 ... ."). For a
more extensive discussion of House Bill No. 1717, see infra notes 280-90 and
accompanying text.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (Supp 111990). Section 1961 provides that" 'racke-
teering activity' means. . . any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, gam-
bling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing
in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year." Id. Additionally, "racke-
teering activity" is defined to incorporate conduct prohibited in over 50 differ-
ent sections of Tide 18 of the United States Code, as well as conduct prohibited
in several sections of Title 29 and Tide 11. Id. § 1961(1)(B)-(D). The offenses
that underlie RICO actions are commonly referred to as "predicates" or "predi-
cate acts." See, e.g., HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 237
(1989) (Congress did envision some circumstances where two "predicates"
would suffice to establish pattern).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988). RICO does not expressly define the term
"pattern." Instead, the statute provides, in pertinent part, that a "'pattern of
racketeering activity' requires at least two acts of racketeering activity." Id. (em-
phasis added). Those Supreme Court Justices who have participated in deci-
sions involving RICO are in unanimous agreement that this statutory provision
merely sets forth "a minimum necessary condition for the existence of ... a
pattern" under RICO. Northwestern Bell, 492 U.S. at 237 (majority opinion au-
thored by Justice Brennan and joined by justices White, Marshall, Blackmun and
Stevens); id. at 255 (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy) (RICO "describ[es] what is needful but not
sufficient" for pattern). justice Souter, who replaced justice Brennan on the
Court in 1990, andJustice Thomas, who replaced Justice Marshall in 1991, have
yet to participate in a reported decision involving RICO's pattern requirement.
10. 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
11. Id. at 256 (Scalia, J., concurring) (ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy joined injustice Scalia's concurring opinion).
1700
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[a constitutional] challenge is presented."' 12
Inevitably, in the two and one-half years since Northwestern Bell was
decided, numerous defendants have accepted Justice Scalia's invitation
to challenge RICO's constitutionality.' 3 RICO's detractors, bolstered
by Justice Scalia's remarks, have resurrected the argument that RICO's
pattern requirement is unconstitutional because the term "pattern" is
not adequately defined in the statute and, therefore, its meaning is im-
permissibly vague.1 4 Because the vast majority of RICO actions are
predicated on a pattern of racketeering,' 5 a successful challenge to the
constitutionality of the pattern requirement would effectively emasculate
12. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia chastised the Court for failing
to provide meaningful guidance as to the proper interpretation of the pattern
requirement. Id. at 251 (Scalia,J., concurring). The concurringJustices accused
the Court of simply repromulgating "hints" about the meaning of the pattern
requirement and of giving instructions to the lower courts on how to interpret
the pattern requirement that were "about as helpful to the conduct of their af-
fairs as 'life is a fountain.'" Id. at 252 (Scalia, J., concurring).
13. Understandably, members of the defense bar were quick to interpose
constitutional challenges to RICO's pattern requirement in pending cases. In a
number of cases the constitutionality of the pattern requirement was raised for
the first time at the appellate level. See, e.g., Busby v. Crown Supply, Inc., 896
F.2d 833, 836 (4th Cir. 1990) (court declined to address constitutionality of pat-
tern requirement where issue not raised in district court); Newmyer v. Philatelic
Leasing, Ltd., 888 F.2d 385, 397-98 (6th Cir. 1989) (court declined to address
constitutional issue not raised in lower court because "the question of RICO's
constitutionality is not beyond any doubt, and no injustice would result from
allowing the issue to be addressed in the first instance by the district court"),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2169 (1990). In other cases, the defendant attempted to
raise the constitutional issue for the first time near the end of the lawsuit. See,
e.g., Minpeco, S.A. v. Hunt, 724 F. Supp. 259, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (court re-
jected defendants' attempt to challenge constitutionality of pattern requirement
eight years after origin of lawsuit and after post-trial motions had been decided).
For other cases challenging the constitutionality of RICO's pattern requirement
after the Court's decision in Northwestern Bell, see infra notes 138-279 and accom-
panying text.
14. Previous challenges to the constitutionality of RICO's pattern require-
ment were unsuccessful and the argument had been largely abandoned in recent
years. For a discussion of cases decided prior to Northwestern Bell in which the
constitutionality of RICO's pattern requirement was challenged, see infra notes
39-40 and accompanying text.
Constitutional attacks on the pattern requirement are based on the "void-
for-vagueness" doctrine, which requires that statutes provide sufficient guidance
to citizens, those in law enforcement and the judiciary. For a discussion of the
void-for-vagueness doctrine, see infra notes 85-107 and accompanying text.
15. See ORGANIZED CRIME AND RACKETEERING SECTION, CRIMINAL Div., U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS
(RICO): A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS 70 (3rd rev. ed. 1990) [hereinaf-
ter Rico MANUAL] ("collection of unlawful debt is not very often charged in
RICO counts"), reprinted in THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL 9-2176.102 (P-
H 1991); Kennedy, Civil RICO in the Antitrust Context, 55 ANTITRUST LJ. 463, 486
(1986) (no civil RICO actions brought prior to 1986 on allegations of unlawful
debt collection); Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & I, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 661, 724 (1987) (only five of 236 criminal RICO cases to reach
federal courts of appeals prior to 1986 involved allegations of loansharking).
5
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the statute. 16 Furthermore, a decision that the pattern requirement was
unconstitutionally vague would have serious consequences if applied
retroactively.17 As of this writing, the United States Supreme Court has
not yet addressed a constitutional challenge to RICO's pattern
requirement.
This Comment examines the constitutionality of RICO's pattern re-
quirement. To lay the groundwork for the examination, this Comment
traces the legislative origins of the pattern requirement 18 and the
Supreme Court's discussions of the pattern requirement in RICO cases
where the constitutionality of the pattern requirement was not expressly
challenged. 19 This Comment then surveys those civil and criminal cases
decided after Northwestern Bell in which the United States Courts of Ap-
peals and United States District Courts have expressly considered the
argument that RICO's pattern requirement is unconstitutionally
vague.20 Next, this Comment reviews the present legislative proposals
16. Presumably, even if RICO's pattern requirement were found to be im-
permissibly vague, the remainder of the statute would not be invalidated. The
United States Supreme Court has implicitly recognized that an entire statute is
not invalidated just because one part of that statute is struck down as unconstitu-
tionally vague. See A.B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233, 242
(1925) (upholding validity and application of one section of federal statute after
declaring another section of same statute unconstitutionally vague); see also New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 n.24 (1982) (where severable part of federal
statute is struck down as unconstitutionally overbroad, remainder of statute
should not be invalidated (citing United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402
U.S. 363 (1971))); United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 580-81 (1973) (where severable part of federal statute
struck down as unconstitutionally overbroad, remainder of statute not invali-
dated). Even if the part of RICO not related to the pattern requirement could
be severed, however, the statute would have greatly decreased value to prosecu-
tors and private plaintiffs because the remaining portion of the statute would
encompass only those relatively few cases involving loansharking. For a discus-
sion of the scarcity of RICO cases involving unlawful debt collection, see supra
note 15.
17. See Note, RICO's "Pattern "Requirement: Void For Vagueness?, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 489, 525 (1990) [hereinafter Note, Void For Vagueness] ("If RICO were held
void for vagueness .... application of the rule on collateral review could have
the effect of 'opening the jail doors.' A court should therefore hesitate before
declaring RICO unconstitutionally vague."); see also Note, Mother of Mercy---Is
This the End of RICO?", 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1106, 1149-50 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter Note, Is This the End of RICO] (arguing that RICO's pattern requirement
should not be found unconstitutionally vague; but, if found vague, holding
should not be applied retroactively).
18. For a discussion of the legislative origins of RICO's pattern require-
ment, see infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of cases where the Supreme Court has discussed the
pattern requirement, see infra notes 46-84 and accompanying text.
20. This Comment focuses on federal rather than state judicial interpreta-
tions of RICO. The Supreme Court has confirmed the concurrent jurisdiction of
state courts in civil RICO actions. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990).
The Court declared, however, that despite this concurrent jurisdiction, federal
courts "retain full authority and responsibility for the application of federal
criminal laws." Id. at 464 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1988) (granting federal dis-
1702 [Vol. 36: p. 1697
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to clarify the pattern requirement. 2 1 This Comment then predicts that
the Supreme Court will ultimately face and reject the argument that
RICO's pattern requirement is unconstitutionally vague as applied in a
criminal context.22 Furthermore, although the argument that the pat-
tern requirement is unconstitutionally vague may be more persuasive in
a civil context, this Comment concludes that the Supreme Court will
ultimately reject that argument as well. 23
II. BACKGROUND
Commentators have long debated the proper scope of RICO's cov-
erage.2 4 Most commentators, and the Supreme Court, agree that the
statute was enacted primarily to combat the infiltration of organized
crime into legitimate businesses by "the archetypal, intimidating mob-
ster." 25 In addition to this primary purpose, however, Supreme Court
decisions have removed any doubt that the RICO statute also covers
trict courts original jurisdiction in cases involving offenses against laws of Untied
States)). The Court also noted that federal courts are not bound by state court
interpretations of the federal RICO statute and state court judgments interpret-
ing RICO are ultimately subject to direct review by the United States Supreme
Court. See id. For a discussion of cases after Northwestern Bell in which federal
courts have confronted challenges to the constitutionality of the pattern require-
ment, see infra notes 138-279 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the present legislative proposals to clarify the pat-
tern requirement, see infra notes 280-90 and accompanying text.
22. For a prediction of the Supreme Court's ultimate holding when faced
with a constitutional challenge to RICO's pattern requirement, see infra notes
306-38 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the argument that RICO may be constitutional in its
criminal applications but unconstitutional in its civil applications, see infra 339-
44 and accompanying text.
24. Commentators strongly disagree over whether RICO's present broad
scope was intended when the statute was passed by Congress. Compare Blakey &
Gettings, supra note 3, at 10 13-14 (contending RICO originally intended to deal
with "all types of organized criminal behavior.., from simple political corrup-
tion to sophisticated white-collar schemes to traditional Mafia-type endeavors")
and Blakey & Perry, supra note 4, at 860-69 (attacking "myth" that RICO initially
intended to deal solely with organized crime) with Lynch, A Conceptual, Practical,
and Political Guide to RICO Reform, 43 VAND. L. REv. 769, 770-76 (1990) (contend-
ing RICO originally intended to combat more traditional concept of "organized
cnme," but conceding RICO has since grown far broader than earliest concept).
25. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985). As set forth in
the legislative history, RICO's purpose was "the elimination of the infiltration of
organized crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in in-
terstate commerce." S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969). The
Supreme Court has acknowledged that Congress' primary motivation for enact-
ing RICO was to combat organized crime. See HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 492 U.S. 229, 245 (1989) ("[o]rganized crime was without a doubt Con-
gress' major target" in drafting RICO); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576,
591 (1981) ("primary purpose of RICO is to cope with the infiltration of legiti-
mate business" by organized crime). For an extensive discussion of the motiva-
tion behind the drafting of the law that ultimately became RICO, see Lynch,
supra note 15, at 666-80 (setting forth legislative history of RICO); see also Califa,
1991] 1703COMMENT
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"legitimate" enterprises that engage in a pattern of criminal conduct.2 6
Because of the statute's broad scope, RICO defendants range from ca-
reer criminals accused of classic organized crime activities,2 7 to persons
accused of bribing politicians, 28 to accountants and law firms involved in
the administration of estates. 29 Furthermore, in addition to the statute's
breadth, Congress has pronounced that RICO should be "liberally con-
strued to effectuate its remedial purposes."8 0
RICO Threatens Civil Liberties, 43 VAND. L. REV. 805, 807-10 (1990) (reviewing
legislative history of RICO).
26. Northwestern Bell, 492 U.S. at 246 (Congress deliberately "adopted com-
modious language capable of extending beyond organized crime"). RICO's
commodious language has arguably led to some abuse in its civil applications.
Chief Justice Rehnquist has stated that
[v]irtually everyone who has addressed the question agrees that civil
RICO is now being used in ways that Congress never intended when it
enacted the statute in 1970. Most of the civil suits filed under the stat-
ute have nothing to do with organized crime. They are the garden-
variety civil fraud cases of the type traditionally litigated in state courts.
... I think the time has arrived for Congress to enact amendments to
civil RICO to limit its scope to the sort of wrongs that are connected to
organized crime, or have some other reason for being in Federal Court.
ChiefJustice Rehnquist, Remarks at the Brookings Institution Eleventh Annual
Seminar on the Administration ofJustice, Williamsburg, Virginia (Apr. 7, 1989),
reprinted in J. RAKOFF & H. GOLDSTEIN, RICO: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAW AND
STRATEGY § 12.041l] n.3 (1990). Similarly, Robert Bork, whose 1987 nomina-
tion to the United States Supreme Court failed to win Senate approval, has been
quoted as saying: "What does the phrase 'pattern of racketeering' mean? No-
body knows. Congress should repeal the damn thing and start over again."
Dowd, The U.S. Legal System is Breaking Down , FORTUNE, Mar. 26, 1990, at 146.
Even Professor Blakey, one of the drafters of RICO, acknowledges that the stat-
ute has been abused in certain civil applications. See Petition for Writ of Certio-
rari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at 18-23,
McMonagle v. Northeast Women's Center, 889 F.2d 466 (3d Cir.) (No. 88-1644)
(Professor Blakey was lead counsel on petition arguing that RICO's use against
pro-life protestors was abuse of civil RICO), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989).
In recent years civil litigants have "stretched" the statute to encompass such
alleged RICO violations as the operation of "speed traps" by police and the
publication of Roseanne Barr's love letters. The Law That Ate All Common Sense;
Motorist Uses RICO Statute Against Traffic Cops For Operating a Speed Trap!, L.A.
Times, Aug. 24, 1990, at B6, col. 3; Lichtblau, Barr Sues 2 Tabloids For Printing Her
Love Letters, L.A. Times, Oct. 5, 1990, at B3, col. 5.
27. See, e.g., United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084 (3rd Cir. 1990) (us-
ing RICO against members of Scarfo organized crime family), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 2009-11 (1991). For a discussion of RICO cases involving members of tradi-
tional organized crime families, see infra notes 151-200 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., United States v. Woods, 915 F.2d 854 (3d Cir. 1990) (using
RICO against politicians charged with accepting bribes regarding awarding of
work contracts), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1413 (1991). For a further discussion of
Woods, see infra notes 201-07 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., Firestone v. Galbreath, 747 F. Supp. 1556 (S.D. Ohio 1990)
(using RICO against accountants and lawyers regarding dispute over disposition
of estate assets). For a further discussion of Firestone, see infra notes 265-79.
30. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84
Stat. 922, 947. The mandate for liberal construction was not codified. Some
commentators argue that a liberal construction of RICO is only mandated in
8
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In the first years after its passage in 1970, RICO was used sparsely
in criminal prosecutions"' and virtually never in civil actions.3 2 In the
early 1980s, however, the annual number of civil and criminal RICO
cases rose markedly.33
civil cases, because criminal RICO actions are not "remedial." See D. SMrrH & T.
REED, CIVIL RICO 1.02, at 1-10 to 1-11 (1991) (arguing against liberal con-
struction of statute in criminal RICO actions). But see Russello v. United States,
464 U.S. 16, 27 (1983) (citing liberal construction clause as support for liberal
interpretation in case involving RICO's criminal forfeiture provision); see also
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497-98 (1985) (Supreme Court
recognized that RICO's "'remedial purposes' (are] nowhere more evident" than
in civil suits, thus implying remedial purposes mandating liberal construction
exist to some extent in criminal actions). For an excellent discussion of the pur-
pose and proper use of the liberal construction clause, see Note, RICO and the
Liberal Construction Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 167 (1980) (authored by Craig W.
Palm).
31. See Dennis, Current RICO Policies of the Department ofJustice, 43 VAND. L.
REV. 651, 652 (1990) (noting that 30 or fewer criminal RICO suits were filed
annually prior to 1981). RICO's slow start may be attributable, at least in part,
to uncertainty concerning the reach of the statute. See it at 653. One major
uncertainty was clarified in 1981 when the Supreme Court held that RICO could
be used not only against organized criminals infiltrating legitimate businesses,
but also against organized criminals engaging in wholly illegitimate businesses
such as illegal gambling. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 590
(1981). A second major uncertainty about the scope of RICO was clarified in
1983 when the Court held that proceeds and profits derived from racketeering
activity were "interests" subject to forfeiture under § 1963(a)(1) of the statute.
See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 22 (1983).
Shortly after Russello was decided, a number of high-profile RICO prosecu-
tions against major Mafia figures attracted "enormous media coverage." Den-
nis, supra, at 653. Dennis asserts that "[t]his coverage spurred FBI offices and
federal prosecutors throughout the country to increase significantly the number
of RICO investigations and to accelerate the completion of RICO cases already
initiated." Id For examples of high-profile prosecutions, see id. at 653 & nn.9 &
11-17.
32. See Dennis, supra note 31, at 562-53. In 1985, the Supreme Court noted
that "[o]f 270 District Court [civil] RICO decisions prior to this year, only 3%
(nine cases) were decided throughout the 1970's, 2% were decided in 1980, 7%0
in 1981, 13% in 1982, 33% in 1983, and 43% in 1984." Sedima, 473 U.S. at481
n.1 (citing ABA CIVIL RICO REPORT, supra note 7, at 55)). One reason that
fewer civil RICO suits were filed prior to 1985 may be that uncertainty existed as
to whether a criminal conviction for the underlying offenses was required before
a civil RICO suit could be brought. See id. at 485-86 & n.6. In 1985, the
Supreme Court expressly rejected the "prior-conviction requirement" argu-
ment. Id. at 493. Another possible reason for the increase in civil RICO actions
in the 1980s was the Department ofJustice's contemporaneous success in crimi-
nal RICO prosecutions. See Reed, The Defense Casefor RICO Reform, 43 VAND. L.
REV. 691, 707 (1990) (Department ofJustice's success, coupled with availability
of attorneys' fees and treble damages, caused increased utilization of civil
RICO).
33. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 481 n.l. Just how dramatically the number of civil
RICO suits has increased in recent years is a hotly contested issue. Professor
Blakey contends that between 1,000 and 10,000 civil RICO cases are filed each
year. See Blakey & Perry, supra note 4, at 869-73. Some RICO critics, however,
claim that as many as 40,000 RICO claims are filed annually. Id. at 879 (ac-
knowledging contention of Rep. Rick Boucher).
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A. Legislative History of the Pattern Requirement
As originally drafted, RICO provided: "The term 'pattern of racke-
teering activity' includes at least one act occurring after the effective date
of this chapter."'34 Prior to RICO's passage, however, the Department
of Justice proposed that the original language be amended to read:
"The term 'pattern of racketeering' means at least two acts, one of which
occurred after the effective date of this chapter."'3 5 Ultimately, the term
"pattern of racketeering" was not precisely defined in the RICO statute.
Instead, Congress chose simply to provide that "[t]he term 'pattern of
racketeering' requires at least two acts, one of which occurred after the
effective date of this chapter."3 6 At the same time, however, RICO's
congressional sponsors indicated that something more than the two predi-
cate acts was necessary before a pattern existed.3 7 Thus, with a mini-
mum requirement, but no comprehensive definition, courts began the
formidable task of interpreting RICO's pattern requirement.3 8
The number of criminal RICO suits has also increased dramatically. See
Kennedy, supra note 15, at 485 (statistics showing 62 criminal RICO cases filed
in 1982, increasing to 102 cases filed in 1983, 122 cases filed in 1984 and 92
cases filed in 1985); see also Hughes, supra note 4, at 643 (as of 1989, average of
100 to 125 criminal RICO cases filed each year). Nevertheless, criminal RICO
suits presently account for only a small percentage of the total number of RICO
suits filed each year.
34. S. REP. No. 617, supra note 25, at 122 (emphasis added).
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988). A "required" element may only be a small
part of what an entire concept "means." As a verb, "mean" denotes: "To have
in mind as a purpose or intention." 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 520 (2d ed.
1989). In contrast, the verb "require" denotes: "To demand as necessary or
essential on general principles, or in order to comply with or satisfy some regu-
lation." 13 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 682 (2d ed. 1989). It can be argued
that when a statute specifies what a term "means," nothing other than what is
specified is needed. When a statute provides that something is "required," how-
ever, it can be argued that elements are needed in addition to those specified.
See McClellan, The Organized Crime Control Act (S.30) or Its Critics: Which Threatens
Civil Liberties?, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 55, 144 (1970) ("[C]ommission of two or
more acts of racketeering activity is made a necessary, but not a sufficient, ele-
ment of a pattern under Title IX.").
37. Senator McClellan, one of RICO's sponsors, noted during debate prior
to the passage of the statute that "proof of two acts of racketeering activity,
without more, does not establish a pattern." 116 Cong. Rec. 18,940 (1970).
Responding to criticism of RICO after its passage, Senator McClellan again
flatly rejected the argument that two isolated acts of criminal activity, without
more, could constitute a RICO violation. See McClellan, supra note 36, at 144; see
also ABA CIVIL RICO REPORT, supra note 7, at 193-94 (likely that Congress in-
tentionally drafted pattern provision to provide minimum requirement rather
than meaning of "pattern").
38. For a discussion of how some states have simplified the interpretation
of the pattern definitions in their state anti-racketeering statutes, see infra notes
292-305 and accompanying text.
1706
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B. Early Judicial Interpretations of the Pattern Requirement
Defendants in several early RICO cases argued that the statute's
pattern requirement was unconstitutionally vague.3 9 These vagueness
arguments, similar to the one invited by Justice Scalia in his concurring
opinion in Northwestern Bell, were uniformly rejected at the district court
level.40 Consequently, while the number of RICO cases filed annually
increased, the void-for-vagueness attacks on RICO's pattern require-
ment were largely abandoned. 4
1
Although defendants in early RICO cases discontinued their consti-
tutional challenges to the statute's pattern requirement, they continued
to argue that their acts did not constitute a pattern of racketeering under
RICO. Courts invariably rejected the defendants' arguments and found
that a pattern existed, although the courts reached that conclusion using
a number of different analyses. Many decisions were based on the ra-
tionale that any two predicate acts, even if occurring within a single brief
episode, sufficed to constitute a pattern. 4 2 In other decisions, courts
39. See, e.g., United States v. Boffa, 513 F. Supp. 444, 459-60 (D. Del. 1980)
(motion to dismiss RICO indictment on ground that RICO's pattern require-
ment is unconstitutionally vague in context of mail fraud, violation of Taft-Hart-
ley Act and falsification of corporate documents); United States v. White, 386 F.
Supp. 882, 883 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (motion to dismiss RICO indictment on ground
that RICO's pattern requirement is unconstitutionally vague in context of mail
fraud and interstate transportation of stolen property).
40. See, e.g., Boffa, 513 F. Supp. at 462-63 (rejecting argument that RICO
unconstitutionally vague due to failure adequately to define "pattern of racke-
teering"); White, 386 F. Supp. at 883-84 (same).
41. Other provisions of RICO have likewise withstood challenges of uncon-
stitutional vagueness. See United States v. Tripp, 782 F.2d 38, 42 (6th Cir.) (re-jecting argument that RICO provision incorporating state racketeering laws
made statute unconstitutionally vague), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1128 (1986); United
States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (rejecting argument
that RICO conspiracy provision unconstitutionally vague), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
933 (1979); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 479 (5th Cir. 1976) (rejecting
argument that RICO "enterprise" requirement unconstitutionally vague);
United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 612-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (rejecting
argument that failure to define phrase "conduct or participate" in § 1962(c)
made RICO unconstitutionally vague).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Jennings, 842 F.2d 159, 163 (6th Cir. 1988)
(two telephone calls on same day sufficient to establish pattern); United States v.
Watchmaker, 761 F.2d 1459, 1475 (11th Cir. 1985) (three separate acts of at-
tempted murder in single criminal episode constituted RICO violation), cert. de-
nied, 474 U.S. 1100 (1986); United States v. Bascaro, 742 F.2d 1335, 1360-61
(1 th Cir. 1984) (acts of importation, possession and intent to distribute mari-
juana constituted pattern where each act was separate crime), cert. denied, 472
U.S. 1017 (1985); United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1039 (5th Cir. Unit B
Dec. 1981) (aiding and abetting drug importation and travel in aid of same crime
sufficed to constitute pattern), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982); United States v.
Starnes, 644 F.2d 673, 677-78 (7th Cir.) (arson, traveling in interstate commerce
with intent to commit arson and mail fraud to collect insurance proceeds from
arson constituted pattern), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 826 (1981); United States v.
Karas, 624 F.2d 500, 504 (4th Cir. 1980) (payment of bribe in three installments
constituted pattern), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1078 (1981).
11
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held that two acts related to the same enterprise were sufficient to estab-
lish a pattern.43 Other courts took a more restrictive view, holding that
a pattern existed only if the underlying predicate acts were related to
each other.44 Finally, a few district courts even suggested that con-
tinuity of the predicate acts might be necessary before a pattern could be
found.4 5
C. Supreme Court Guidance in Interpreting the Pattern Requirement
1. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.
In 1985, the United States Supreme Court, aware that lower federal
courts had rendered conflicting interpretations of various RICO provi-
sions, 46 granted certiorari in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex CO.4 7 In Sedima,
43. See, e.g., United States v. Sinito, 723 F.2d 1250, 1261 (6th Cir. 1983)
(two predicate crimes "unrelated to one another" but related to enterprise suffi-
cient to establish pattern), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817 (1984); United States v.
Zang, 703 F.2d 1186, 1194 (10th Cir. 1982) (government need only prove two
or more predicate acts related to enterprise to establish pattern), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 828 (1983); United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804, 830 & n.47 (5th Cir.
1980) (two acts of bribery associated with enterprise would be sufficient to es-
tablish pattern); United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1124 (2d Cir.) (any
two acts of racketeering related to enterprise sufficient to establish pattern), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 899 n.23 (5th
Cir.) (two or more predicate crimes related to enterprise sufficient to establish
pattern; "interrelatedness" of acts unnecessary), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
For the text of RICO's definition of "enterprise," see supra note 3.
44. See, e.g., United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208, 1222 (9th Cir. 1982)
(pattern requires connection of two or more acts by "common scheme, plan or
motive"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983); United States v. Starnes, 644 F.2d
673, 677-78 (7th Cir.) (acts "connected to each other in some logical manner so
as to effect an unlawful end" suffice to establish pattern), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
826 (1981); United States v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855, 860-61 (7th Cir.) (pattern re-
quires "interrelatedness" of predicate acts (quoting United States v. White, 386
F. Supp. 882, 883-84 (E.D. Wis. 1974))), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 921 (1977).
45. See, e.g., Teleprompter of Erie, Inc. v. City of Erie, 537 F. Supp. 6, 12-13(W.D. Pa. 1981) (RICO enacted "to prevent incidents constituting, or likely to
constitute[,] a continuous course of unlawful conduct"); United States v. Moel-
ler, 402 F. Supp. 49, 57-58 (D. Conn. 1975) (if not constrained by decision of
appellate court, district court would hold that pattern required acts occurring in
"different criminal episodes" or acts "somewhat separated in time and place yet
still sufficiently related by purpose to demonstrate a continuity of activity").
46. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1985) (acknowl-
edging that certiorari was granted because of "variety of approaches taken by
the lower courts" interpreting RICO).
47. 469 U.S. 1157 (1984). Sedima, a Belgian corporation, entered into ajoint venture with Imrex. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 483
(1985). The parties agreed that Sedima would solicit orders for electronic com-
ponents from purchasers in Europe and that Imrex would obtain those compo-
nents in the United States and ship them to Europe. Id. at 483-84. Sedima and
Imrex were to split the net proceeds. Id. at 484. Sedima, however, became con-
vinced that Imrex was billing it for nonexistent expenses. Id. As a result,
Sedima brought suit alleging that Imrex had engaged in a pattern of mail and
wire fraud to overcharge at least $175,000 in fictitious expenses. Id.
12
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the Supreme Court chided both Congress and the lower courts for fail-
ing "to develop a meaningful concept of 'pattern.' ,,48 Then, although
the meaning of "pattern" was not at issue in Sedima,49 in dicta, the Court
provided a modicum of guidance concerning the proper interpretation
of RICO's pattern requirement.50 In what was to become known to
RICO practitioners and scholars as the "Sedima footnote" or "footnote
14," the Court pronounced that "continuity plus relationship" of predi-
cate acts was necessary to form a pattern under RICO.5 t Two isolated
48. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 500. The Court noted that most civil RICO actions
were brought against legitimate businesses rather than against the "archetypal
intimidating mobster" and acknowledged that it had "doubts" about RICO's
"increasing divergence" from what was originally intended by the bill's drafters.
Id at 499-500. The Court attributed this divergence both to the "breadth of the
predicate offenses, in particular ... wire, mail, and securities fraud, and the
failure of Congress and the courts to develop a meaningful concept of 'pat-
tern.'" Id. at 500.
49. The issues in Sedima were: 1) whether prior criminal convictions for the
underlying predicate offenses were necessary before a RICO action could be
brought; and 2) whether a RICO plaintiff was required to allege a "racketeering
injury" of the type RICO was designed to deter. Id. at 484-85. The Supreme
Court rejected the holding of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit that civil RICO claims were properly limited to instances where the de-
fendant had already been criminally convicted for the underlying offenses. Id. at
493. The Court also rejected as "amorphous" and "unhelpfully tautological"
the Second Circuit's finding that a civil RICO plaintiff must establish a "racke-
teering injury" that was "caused by an activity which RICO was designed to de-
ter," rather than simply an injury from the predicate acts. Id. at 493-95 (quoting
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 496 (2d Cir. 1984)).
50. Id. at 496 n.14.
51. L The Court drew the "continuity plus relationship" language from
the legislative history of the statute. See id (quoting S. REP. No. 617, supra note
25, at 158). The full text of footnote 14 is as follows:
As many commentators have pointed out, the definition of a "pat-
tern of racketeering activity" differs from the other provisions in
§ 1961 in that it states that a pattern "requires at least two acts of racke-
teering activity," § 1961(5) (emphasis added), not that it "means" two
such acts. The implication is that while two acts are necessary, they
may not be sufficient. Indeed, in common parlance two of anything do
not generally form a "pattern." The legislative history supports the
view that two isolated acts of racketeering activity do not constitute a
pattern. As the Senate Report explained: "The target of [RICO] is
thus not sporadic activity. The infiltration of legitimate business nor-
mally requires more than one 'racketeering activity' and the threat of
continuing activity to be effective. It is this factor of continuity plus rela-
tionship which combines to produce a pattern." S. Rep. No. 91-617, p.
158 (1969) (emphasis added). Similarly, the sponsor of the Senate bill,
after quoting this portion of the Report, pointed out to his colleagues
that "[t]he term 'pattern' itself requires the showing of a relationship
.... So, therefore, proof of two acts of racketeering activity, without
more, does not establish a pattern. ... " 116 Cong. Rec. 18940 (1970)
(statement of Sen. McClellan). See also id, at 35193 (statement of Rep.
Pofi) (RICO "not aimed at the isolated offender"); House Hearings, at
665. Significantly, in defining "pattern" in a later provision of the same
bill, Congress was more enlightening: "[C]riminal conduct forms a
pattern if it embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar pur-
13
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acts of racketeering would not suffice. The Court also suggested that
further guidance as to the meaning of RICO's pattern requirement
might be found in the broad definition of "pattern" contained in one of
RICO's sister statutes. 52 The consequence of the Court's dicta in foot-
note 14 was accurately described byJustice Scalia in a later case: "Thus
enlightened, the district and circuit courts set out 'to develop a mean-
ingful concept of "pattern"' and promptly produced the widest and
most persistent circuit split on an issue of federal law in recent
memory."53
In response to the Supreme Court's directive in Sedima, the various
United States Courts of Appeals adopted "tests" for the pattern require-
ment.5 4 Because the tests differed from circuit to circuit, however, facts
poses, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or
otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not
isolated events." 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e). This language may be useful in
interpreting other sections of the Act. Cf Jannelli v. United States, 420
U.S. 770, 789 (1975).
Id. In footnote 14, the Court advocated an approach that was contrary to the
approaches taken by a number of the courts of appeals and district courts prior
to Sedima. For a discussion of the approaches taken by the lower courts prior to
Sedima, see supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
appropriateness of the Supreme Court's reliance on the "continuity plus rela-
tionship" phrase in RICO's legislative history, see infra note 65.
52. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14. RICO was one of 12 substantive tides in
the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922.
The Court suggested that the definition of "pattern" in the Dangerous Special
Offender Sentencing Act, Title X of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970(formerly codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1982) (repealed 1987)), might be
helpful in interpreting the RICO pattern requirement. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496
n.14. For the full text of Title X's pattern requirement, which was included in
footnote 14 of the Court's opinion, see supra note 51.
Interestingly, even before the Sedima decision, some lower courts had
looked to the definition of pattern in Title X "to cast light on the [meaning of
the] word 'pattern.'" See, e.g., United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 614
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (RICO's pattern requirement should be construed with refer-
ence to Title X's pattern requirement). A number of other courts, however, had
rejected arguments that they should seek guidance from Title X's pattern re-
quirement in interpreting the RICO pattern requirement. See, e.g., United States
v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1122-23 (2d Cir. 1980) (fact that RICO and Title X
"were enacted simultaneously yet embody different definitions of 'pattern'
would seem to indicate that Congress intentionally chose to use the term differ-
ently in different contexts"); United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 784(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (if Congress intended Title X's pattern requirement to shed
light on meaning of RICO's pattern requirement, it should have made that in-
tention clear).
53. HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 251 (1989)
(ScaliaJ., concurring) (citation omitted).
54. Absent further explanation, the Court's pronouncement that a pattern
required "continuity plus relationship" generally proved to be of little assistance
to the courts of appeals in their attempts to develop a meaningful concept of
pattern. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit adopted the
most restrictive test for pattern, requiring that two distinct criminal schemes be
proven. See Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252, 254-57 (8th Cir. 1986)
14
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that sufficed to establish a pattern in one circuit might fail to establish a
pattern in another circuit. Three years later, largely as a result of the
split in the circuits that followed Sedima, the Supreme Court accepted
certiorari in another case that would allow it to revisit the meaning of
RICO's pattern requirement. 5 5
2. HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.
In H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.,56 the Supreme Court
began its opinion by briefly reviewing the different, and sometimes con-
flicting, tests utilized by the various courts of appeals to determine the
presence of a pattern. 57 The Court did not blame the judiciary for the
confusion among the circuits. Instead, the Court placed the blame
squarely on Congress for failing to clarify adequately the pattern re-
quirement.58 The Court then proceeded to interpret RICO's pattern
requirement.
In interpreting the pattern requirement, the Northwestern Bell Court
looked to the text and legislative history of RICO for guidance.5 9 The
(several related acts in furtherance of "one continuing scheme" to convert prop-
erty not sufficient to establish pattern). The United States Courts of Appeals for
the Second and Fifth Circuits retained the most lenient test for pattern, requir-
ing only two related predicate acts. See United States v. lanniello, 808 F.2d 184,
189-93 (2d Cir. 1986) (labeling Sedima footnote 14 as non-controlling and hold-
ing that two acts for purpose of furthering enterprise suffice to establish pat-
tern), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987); R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774
F.2d 1350, 1355 (5th Cir. 1985) (two related acts suffice to establish pattern).
For a discussion of the approaches taken by each of the courts of appeals that
addressed the pattern requirement, see Huestis, Rico: The Meaning of "Pattern"
Since Sedima, 54 BROOKLYN L. REV. 621 (1988); Note, The Pattern Requirement in
Civil RICO is Working: Case Law After Sedima, 33 VILL. L. REV. 205 (1988) (au-
thored by Stephen G. Harvey).
55. HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 485 U.S. 958 (1988). The plain-
tiffs in Northwestern Bell sought review of the holding of the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit that multiple acts of bribery in furtherance of a single scheme
to influence commissioners responsible for approving rate increases for utilities
were not sufficient to constitute a pattern. Northwestern Bell, 492 U.S. at 234-35.
Therefore, unlike Sedima, where the Court was not required to reach the pattern
requirement, the meaning of "pattern" was squarely before the Northwestern Bell
Court. Id. The Court acknowledged that its "task" in Northwestern Bell was to
"develop[] a meaningful concept of 'pattern' within the existing statutory frame-
work." Id. at 236. The Court noted that "[m]ost Courts of Appeals have re-
jected the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of RICO's pattern concept to require
an allegation and proof of multiple schemes, and we granted certiorari to re-
solve this conflict." Id. at 235 (footnote omitted).
56. 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
57. Id. at 235 n.2.
58. Id. at 236. Justice Brennan stated: "Congress has done nothing...
further to illuminate RICO's key requirement of a pattern of racketeering; and
as the plethora of different views expressed by the Courts of Appeals since
Sedima demonstrates, . . . developing a meaningful concept of 'pattern' within
the existing statutory framework has proved to be no easy task." Id.
59. Id. at 237-39.
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Court first consulted RICO's definition of "pattern of racketeering activ-
ity." °6 0 On the basis of that definition, the Court determined that Con-
gress had envisioned not only circumstances in which two predicate acts
would suffice to constitute a pattern, but also circumstances in which
two predicate acts would not suffice to constitute a pattern. 6 ' Accord-
ingly, the Court turned to the issue of what, in addition to two predicate
acts, was necessary before a pattern existed.
The Court stated that, in ordinary usage, the term "pattern" re-
quired an "arrangement or order of things or activity" rather than sim-
ply a "multiplicity of racketeering predicates."'6 2 Therefore, the Court
discerned, the elements in a pattern must bear some relationship "to
each other or to some external organizing principle."'63 The Court then
inferred that Congress' failure to limit expressly the sorts of patterns
that would satisfy the pattern requirement indicated that Congress "had
a fairly flexible concept of a pattern in mind.""
The Court next turned to RICO's legislative history and concluded
that it "reveal[ed] Congress' intent that to prove a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity a plaintiff or prosecutor must show that the racketeering
predicates are related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of con-
tinued criminal activity." 6 5 The Court stated that "[i]t is this factor of
60. Id. at 237. RICO provides, in pertinent part, that a " 'pattern of racke-
teering activity' requires at least two acts of racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(5) (1988).
61. Northwestern Bell, 492 U.S. at 237. The Court noted that § 1961(5) of
RICO
does not so much define a pattern of racketeering activity as state a
minimum necessary condition for the existence of such a pattern....
Section 1961(5) does indicate that Congress envisioned circum-
stances in which no more than two predicates would be necessary to
establish a pattern of racketeering--otherwise it would have drawn a
narrower boundary to RICO liability, requiring proof of a greater
number of predicates. But, at the same time, the statement that a pat-
tern "requires at least" two predicates implies "that while two acts are
necessary, they may not be sufficient."
Id. (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985)).
62. Id. at 238 (quoting 11 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 357 (2d ed. 1989)).
The Court looked at the ordinary usage of the term "pattern" because of its
"assumption that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning
of the words used." Id. (quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9
(1962)).
63. Id. The Court stated that "it is not the number of predicates but the
relationship that they bear to each other or to some external organizing princi-
ple that renders them 'ordered' or 'arranged.' " Id.
64. Id. The Court noted that "[t]he text of RICO conspicuously fails any-
where to identify ... forms of relationship or external principles to be used in
determining whether racketeering activity falls into a pattern for purposes of the
Act." Id.
65. Id. at 239. The Court relied heavily on a statement by one of RICO's
sponsors that a person could not "be subjected to the sanctions of [RICO] sim-
ply for committing two widely separated and isolated criminal offenses." Id.
(quoting 116 CONG. REC. 18,940 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan)). Inter-
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continuity plus relationship which combines to produce a pattern." 6 6
Up to this point, the Court's espousal of a continuity plus relation-
ship test in Northwestern Bell essentially restated the Court's discussion of
pattern in Sedima three years earlier. 67 Noting, however, the "plethora
of different views expressed by the Courts of Appeals since Sedima," the
Court recognized the need for a more extensive explanation of the pat-
tern requirement. 68 Consequently, the Court expounded upon the
meanings of continuity and relationship as requisites for a pattern. 69
First, the Court held that the requirement of relationship would be
satisfied by "criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, re-
sults, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are
interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated
events." 70 Having elaborated on the requirement of relationship, the
Court then shifted its focus to the requirement of continuity.
The Court noted that it was difficult to formulate a general test for
estingly, the Court ignored a seemingly contradictory statement of another of
RICO's sponsors: "A 'pattern of racketeering activity' means simply two or
more acts of racketeering activity [within ten years]." 116 CONG. REC. 35,295
(1970) (statement of Rep. Poff).
At least one commentator has argued that the Court erred in placing any
reliance on Senator McClellan's statement because "the Senator's comment was
made over four months after the Senate passed S. 30, and it was only a small
part of a long, comprehensive defense of [the Organized Crime Control Act]."
See Kelley, "Something Beyond". The Unconstitutional Vagueness of RICO's Pattern Re-
quirement, 40 CATH. U.L. REV. 331, 343-44 (1991). Although Senator McClel-
lan's statement was made on June 9, 1970, approximately six months after the
Senatevoted on S. 30, 116 CONG. REC. 18,940 (1970), it was made four months
prior to the House of Representatives' vote on October 7, 1970 and prior to
October 12, 1970 when the Senate received the bill back from the House for the
Senate's final decision. See 116 CONG. REC. 35,363-64 (1970) (reflecting House
vote on Oct. 7, 1970); 116 CONG. REC. 39,296 (reflecting that Senate agreed to
House amendments and determined to send legislation to President on Oct. 12,
1970); see also ABA CIVIL RICO REPORT, supra note 7, at 119-20 (recounting
RICO's legislative history).
66. Northwestern Bell, 492 U.S. at 239 (quoting S. REP. No. 617, supra note
25, at 158) (emphasis added by Court).
67. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985).
68. Northwestern Bell, 492 U.S. at 236. For a discussion of the failure of the
lower courts to develop a meaningful definition of "pattern" after Sedima, see
supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
69. Northwestern Bell, 492 U.S. at 239-43.
70. Id. at 240 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1982) (repealed 1987)). The
Court relied on the definition of "pattern" in RICO's sister title, the Dangerous
Special Offender Sentencing Act, for guidance on the meaning of relationship.
Id. at 239-40 (citing Title X of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18
U.S.C. §§ 3561-3580 (1982) (repealed 1987)). Four years earlier, in the "Sedima
footnote," the Court had suggested that the lower courts look to that same defi-
nition for guidance. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14. Becaus.e the Sentencing Act
(Title X) abutted RICO (Title IX) in the Organized Crime Control Act, the
Court had "no reason to suppose that Congress had in mind for RICO's pattern
of racketeering component any more constrained a notion of the relationships
between predicates that would suffice." Northwestern Bell, 492 U.S. at 240.
17
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continuity,7 1 but explained that continuity referred "either to a closed
period of repeated conduct, or to past conduct that by its nature
projects into the future with a threat of repetition."'72 The Court further
explained that continuity could be established "by proving a series of
related predicates extending over a substantial period of time."17 3 Rec-
ognizing, however, that "[o]ften a RICO action will be brought before
continuity can be established in this way," the Court stated that the con-
tinuity requirement could also be satisfied by proof of the "threat" of
continued racketeering activity.74 The Court then noted that whether
such a threat existed depended on the facts of each case, and offered
some examples of how a threat could be proved.7 5 Additionally, the
Court flatly rejected the argument that RICO's pattern requirement
should be interpreted narrowly to restrict its application to persons and
associations possessing the traditional characteristics of "organized
crime." 76
71. Northwestern Bell, 492 U.S. at 241. The Court noted that continuity
could be established "in a variety of ways, thus making it difficult to formulate in
the abstract any general test." Id.
72. Id. (citing Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat'l State, 832 F.2d
36, 39 (3d Cir. 1987)).
73. Id. at 242. The Court cautioned that "[p]redicate acts extending over a
few weeks or months and threatening no future criminal conduct do not satisfy
this requirement: Congress was concerned in RICO with long-term criminal
conduct." Id.
74. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 617, supra note 25, at 158).
75. Id. "Without making any claim to cover the field of possibilities," the
Court offered the following examples of how the "threat" of continuity could be
demonstrated:
A RICO pattern may surely be established if the related predicates
themselves involve a distinct threat of long-term racketeering activity,
either implicit or explicit. Suppose a hoodlum were to sell "insurance"
to a neighborhood's storekeepers to cover them against breakage of
their windows, telling his victims he would be reappearing each month
to collect the "premium" that would continue their "coverage."
Though the number of related predicates involved may be small and
they may occur close together in time, the racketeering acts themselves
include a specific threat of repetition extending indefinitely into the fu-
ture, and thus supply the requisite threat of continuity. In other cases,
the threat of continuity may be established by showing that the predi-
cate acts or offenses are part of an ongoing entity's reguli'r way of do-
ing business. Thus, the threat of continuity is sufficiently established
where the predicates can be attributed to a defendant operating as part
of a long-term association that exists for criminal purposes. Such as-
sociations include, but extend well beyond, those traditionally grouped
under the phrase "organized crime." The continuity requirement is
likewise satisfied where it is shown that the predicates are a regular way
of conducting defendant's ongoing legitimate business (in the sense
that it is not a business that exists for criminal purposes), or of
conducting or participating in an ongoing and legitimate RICO
"enterprise."
Id. at 242-43.
76. Id. at 249. Various organizations, including the AFL-CIO, the Ameri-
can Institute of Certified Public Accountants, the National Association of Manu-
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In his concurrence, Justice Scalia characterized the majority opinion
as "about as helpful" to lower courts attempting to interpret RICO's
pattern requirement as the phrase "life is a fountain." 77 Justice Scalia
also contended that the majority erred in relying for guidance on the
definition of "pattern" in one of RICO's sister statutes.7 8 According to
Justice Scalia, the very fact that pattern was defined in the sister statute,
but not in RICO, indicated "that whatever 'pattern' might mean in RICO,
it assuredly does not mean [the same thing as it means in the sister
statute]."79
Furthermore, regardless of the propriety of using the definition of
"pattern" from a sister statute, Justice Scalia flatly rejected the major-
ity's explanation of the relationship and continuity requirements.8" He
found the majority's concept of relationship to be so broad as to be
meaningless8 ' and the majority's concept of continuity to be "murky"
and confusing. 82 Justice Scalia contended that neither he nor the major-
ity was capable of providing the guidance necessary to aid the lower
courts in developing a meaningful concept of pattern.88 Justice Scalia
facturers and the Washington Legal Foundation, filed briefs as amici curiae
urging the adoption of such a narrow interpretation of RICO's pattern require-
ment. Id. at 244 n.5. The Court stated that such an interpretation "would be
counterproductive and a mismeasure of congressional intent." Id at 249.
77. Id. at 252 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia rejected the majority's
analysis, arguing that the majority opinion "added nothing to improve (the
Court's] prior guidance, which has created a kaleidoscope of circuit positions,
except to clarify that RICO may in addition be violated when there is a 'threat of
continuity.' It seems to me this increases rather than removes the vagueness."
Id. at 255 (Scalia, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 252 (Scalia, J., concurring).
79. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia argued: "[W]here Congress
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another
section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally
and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion." Id. (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)). Justice Scalia
also contended that, even if one accepted the propriety of referring to the defini-
tion of "pattern" in RICO's sister statute for guidance, the definition itself was
"utterly uninformative." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
80. Id at 252-54 (Scalia, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 252 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia opined: "It hardly
closes in on the target to know that 'relatedness' refers to acts that are related by
'purposes, results, participants, victims, . . . methods of commission, or Uust in
case that is not vague enough] otherwise.' " Id. (Scalia,J., concurring) (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1982) (repealed 1987)).
82. Id. at 253-54 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia contended that, by
defining the continuity requirement to exclude from RICO's coverage criminal
acts that extended over a "few weeks and months" but did not threaten "future
criminal conduct," the majority created a "safe harbor" for short term criminal
conduct and actually contravened the legislative intent behind RICO. Id.
83. Id. at 254-55 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia remarked:
It is, however, unfair to be so critical of the Court's effort, because
I would be unable to provide an interpretation of RICO that gives sig-
nificantly more guidance concerning its application. It is clear to me
... that the word "pattern".. . was meant to import some requirement
1991] COMMENT 1715
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then concluded his concurring opinion with an "invitation" to defend-
ants to challenge the constitutionality of RICO's pattern requirement.84
D. The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine
1. Rationale Underlying the Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine
Justice Scalia invited a constitutional challenge to RICO based on
the void-for-vagueness doctrine. The void-for-vagueness doctrine ema-
nates from the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution
which require that persons receive due process of law.85 Due process,
the Supreme Court has declared, requires that federal and state statutes
provide sufficient "guidance" not only to those who must obey the laws,
but also to those who must enforce and interpret the laws. 8 6
Supreme Court decisions applying the void-for-vagueness doctrine
focus on three infirmities found in vague statutes. First, vague statutes
fail to give fair guidance to the public as to the nature of the conduct
prohibited.8 7 Second, vague statutes fail to provide sufficient guidance
beyond the mere existence of multiple predicate acts.... But what that
something more is, is beyond me. As I have suggested, it is also be-
yond the Court.
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 255-56 (Scalia, J., concurring). Many, if not most, defendants in
RICO actions accepted justice Scalia's invitation to challenge the constitutional-
ity of RICO's pattern requirement. For a discussion ofJustice Scalia's "invita-
tion," see supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text. For examples of cases
challenging the constitutionality of RICO's pattern requirement, see infra notes
138-279 and accompanying text.
85. U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV. The fifth amendment, which applies to
federal statutes, provides that "[n]o person shall be... deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The four-
teenth amendment, which applies to state statutes, similarly provides that "[n]o
State shall .,.. deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV. For a more extensive discussion of the
circumstances under which the Court will declare a statute unconstitutionally
vague, see Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L.
REv. 67 (1960) (authored by Anthony G. Amsterdam) (this highly regarded au-
thoritative work was authored while Professor Amsterdam was a student).
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is often confused with another constitu-
tional doctrine-overbreadth. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1033-
35 (1988). The two doctrines, however, are separate and distinct. Id. The void-
for-vagueness doctrine invalidates statutes which fail to provide guidance. Id.
The doctrine of overbreadth invalidates statutes which impermissibly encroach
on constitutionally protected conduct. Id. A statute may be: (1) both vague and
overbroad; (2) vague, but not overbroad; or (3) overbroad, but not vague. Thus,
although the same statute may violate both doctrines, the underlying doctrines
are quite different.
86. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983).
87. Id. at 357 (void-for-vagueness doctrine requires penal statute to define
offense "with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what
conduct is prohibited"); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)
(because persons are "free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct," law
must give "reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited"); Lanzetta v.
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to prosecutors and others who are charged with enforcing statutes.88
Third, vague statutes fail to provide sufficient guidance to judges who
are charged with interpreting statutes.8 9
One might expect that the most important function of the void-for-
vagueness doctrine would be to ensure that citizens know what types of
conduct are prohibited so that they can avoid violating the law. Con-
trary to that expectation, however, the Supreme Court has indicated that
the doctrine's most important function is to ensure that law enforcement
officials and judges know what types of conduct are prohibited.90 This
emphasis on guidance to law enforcement officials stems from a concern
that vague statutes "may permit 'a standardless sweep [that] allows
policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal
predilections.' "91
Although the void-for-vagueness doctrine values clarity, proper ap-
plication of the doctrine does not mean that only the most precisely-
drawn statutes will pass constitutional muster.9 2 The Supreme Court
has stated that "[t]he fact that Congress might, without difficulty, have
chosen '[c]learer and more precise language' equally capable of achiev-
ing the end which it sought does not mean that the statute which it in
NewJersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) ("No one may be required at peril of life,
liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes."). Thus; if a
statute "either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application," it will be held unconstitutional. Connally v. General Constr. Co.,
269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (statute requiring contractors to pay workmen "cur-
rent rate of per diem wages in the locality where the work is performed" found
unconstitutionally vague).
88. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357-58. Some commentators have argued that, be-
cause RICO has civil as well as criminal applications, the void-for-vagueness
doctrine must be concerned not only with guidance to those in law enforcement,
but also to private RICO plaintiffs. See Freeman & McSlarrow, RICO and the Due
Process "Void for Vagueness" Test, 45 Bus. LAw. 1003, 1008 (1990) ("private per-
sons are authorized to function as 'private attorneys general' in bringing civil
RICO claims").
89. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (vague
law impermissibly delegated basic policy matters to judges for resolution on ad
hoc and subjective basis). Where a statute is too vague to provide sufficient gui-
dance, the judiciary is arguably placed in the position of usurping the proper
function of the legislature by "making the law" rather than interpreting it. Jef-
feries, Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189,
202-05 & n.40 (1985) (discussing vagueness arguments based on separation of
powers between legislature and judiciary).
90. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358.
91. Id. (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974)).
92. See Note, Is This The End of RICO, supra note 17, at 1118-20 ("[Slince
1960, only a dozen statutes have been held void for vagueness by the Supreme
Court. Of these, fully half of the statutes were facially unconstitutional as vague
regulations of first amendment rights. Two other statutes . . . abridged a
mother's fundamental privacy right to an abortion. Three other statutes ...
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fact drafted is unconstitutionally vague." 93 Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has recognized that the legislature may "advisedly adopt[] a
phrase which ... does not 'admit of precise definition but the meaning
and application of which must be arrived at by. . . "the gradual process
ofjudicial inclusion and exclusion." ' "94 Finally, although the rationale
underlying the void-for-vagueness doctrine is laudable, some commen-
tators contend that the Supreme Court has not applied the doctrine
consistently.9"
2. Application of the Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine
A defendant seeking to challenge a statute as unconstitutionally
vague generally must establish that the statute is impermissibly vague as
applied to her particular factual circumstances.9 6 Only when the chal-
lenged statute implicates first amendment rights may a defendant argue
93. United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 94 (1975) (quoting Untied States
v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7 (1947)). The Court in Powell also held that a statute is
not necessarily unconstitutional even though "doubts as to the applicability of
the [statute] in marginal fact situations may be conceived." Id. Similarly, the
void-for-vagueness doctrine is not "designed to convert into a constitutional di-
lemma the practical difficulties in drawing criminal statutes both general enough
to take into account a variety of human conduct and sufficiently specific to pro-
vide fair warning that certain kinds of conduct are prohibited." Colten v. Ken-
tucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972). Thus, the Court has upheld a number of
statutes containing terms no more precise than pattern. See, e.g., United States v.
Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 8 (1947) (rejecting constitutional challenge to statute
prohibiting use of coercion to compel hiring of "persons in excess of the
number of employees needed"); Kay v. United States, 303 U.S. 1, 9 (1938) (re-
jecting constitutional challenge to statue prohibiting charges in excess of "ordi-
nary fees"); United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 84
(1932) (rejecting constitutional challenge to statute prohibiting mislabeling of
product, subject to "reasonable variations"); United States v. Alford, 274 U.S.
264, 267 (1927) (rejecting constitutional challenge to statute prohibiting fires
"near any forest, timber or inflammable material). But cf. Lanzetta v. New
Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 458 (1939) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague
statue making it unlawful for certain persons to be members of "gang").
94. Federal Trade Comm'n v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304, 312
(1934) (quoting Federal Trade Comm'n v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 648
(1931)) (interpreting phrase "unfair methods of competition" as used in Trade
Commission Act).
95. One commentator likened the Court's application of the doctrine to "a
pair of poolhall scoring racks on one or the other of which, seemingly at ran-
dom, cases get hung up." Note, supra note 85, at 67. Another commentator
remarked: "To understand and rationalize the applications of the doctrine
would require a philosopher's stone, for which one may search in vain in the
reported decisions." Collings, Unconstitutional Uncertaint y-An Appraisal, 40 COR-
NELL L.Q. 195, 196 (1955).
96. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767 (1982) ("The traditional rule is
that a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied may not chal-
lenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitu-
tionally to others in situations not before the Court."); United Sates v. Mazurie,
419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975) ("It is well established that vagueness challenges to
statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in
the light of the facts of the case at hand.").
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that the statute should be invalidated because, although the statute
clearly proscribes her conduct, it would be vague if applied to the con-
duct of certain "hypothetical" persons not before the court.9 7
The void-for-vagueness doctrine applies to both civil and criminal
statutes. 98 The Supreme Court recognizes, however, that the impor-
tance of the guidance required by the doctrine depends, in part, on the
civil or criminal nature of the statute.99 Accordingly, the Court scruti-
nizes civil statutes less severely than criminal statutes because the lesser
penalties for violating civil statutes make the "consequences of impreci-
sion ... qualitatively less severe." 10 0 Although RICO has civil applica-
97. Where the statute alleged to be unconstitutionally vague encroaches
upon first amendment rights, the defendant need not establish that the statute is
impermissibly vague as applied to the facts in the case at bar. NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963) ("[S]tandards of permissible statutory vagueness are
strict in the area of free expression."). Instead, the Court will strike down the
statute as unconstitutionally vague if the statute prohibits conduct protected by
the first amendment, whether or not the petitioner has engaged in the privileged
conduct. Id. The Court relaxes the requirement in first amendment cases in
order to invalidate statutes that would have a chilling effect by discouraging per-
sons from engaging in conduct that is protected by the first amendment.
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (vague statutes cause
citizens to "'steer far wider of the unlawful zone' . . . than if the boundaries of
the forbidden areas were clearly marked" (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S.
360, 372 (1964) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)))).
First amendment challenges to various RICO provisions have been argued
in a number of recent cases. See United States v. Pryba, 900 F.2d 748, 753-56
(4th Cir.) (defendant unsuccessfully argued that RICO forfeiture provisions con-
stituted prior restraint of free expression in violation of first amendment rights
in case involving obscenity violations), cert. denied, I I 1 S. Ct. 305 (1990); North-
east Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1348-49 (3d Cir.) (de-
fendants unsuccessfully argued that RICO unconstitutionally impinged on first
amendment rights to dissent and publication of political views), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 901 (1989); United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 1540-41 (9th Cir.)
(defendant unsuccessfully argued that RICO conspiracy provision violated first
amendment rights to political advocacy and association), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
866 (1988); United States v. Busacca, 739 F. Supp. 370, 378 (N.D. Ohio 1990)
(defendant unsuccessfully argued that RICO's pattern requirement improperly
impinged on right to associate with fellow trustees); Van Schaick v. Church of
Scientology, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1138-39 (D. Mass. 1982) (court dismissed
RICO counts on other grounds, but recognized that first amendment right to
freedom of religion may be implicated in civil RICO action by former church
member against institution).
98. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (criminal statute
challenged as unconstitutionally vague); A.B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Ref.
Co., 267 U.S. 233, 238 (1925) (statute with both civil and criminal applications
challenged as unconstitutionally vague in civil suit).
99. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455
U.S. 489, 498-99 (1982) ("The Court has ... expressed greater tolerance of
enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties because the consequences of
imprecision are qualitatively less severe."). The void for vagueness doctrine
also permits more uncertainty when the law regulates economic behavior, when
the law regulates relatively narrow subject matter or when the law applies only
to those who intentionally or knowingly violate it. Id.
100. Id. (citing Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 137 (1959)
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tions, it cannot be treated under the less-demanding civil standard
because it also has criminal applications.'10 The Supreme Court has
indicated that statutes with both civil and criminal applications must be
construed similarly in both settings and, therefore, statutes with dual
applications will always be held to the more exacting standard applied to
criminal statutes.102
A defendant seeking to have a federal statute, such as RICO, de-
clared unconstitutionally vague faces an uphill battle in certain respects.
First, federal courts afford federal statutes a strong presumption of va-
lidity.' 03 Second, in addition to'the plain language of the statute, fed-
eral courts will also utilize a number of other sources to clarify an
otherwise vague federal statute. These sources include: prior judicial
construction,10 4 external standards' o5 and related statutes.10 6 Third,
where necessary, federal courts will narrow a federal statute, albeit
(Black, J., dissenting); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948)); see
Kolender 461 U.S. 358 n.8 (requirement for certainty greater where statute im-
poses criminal penalties).
101. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963-1964 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990). For a discussion of
the civil and criminal applications of RICO, see supra notes 5-7 and accompany-
ing text. For civil RICO cases in which the constitutionality of the pattern re-
quirement was challenged, see infra notes 239-79 and accompanying text. For
criminal RICO cases in which the constitutionality of the pattern requirement
was challenged, see infra notes 151-238 and accompanying text.
102. FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284, 296 (1954) (FCC
regulation with both civil and criminal penalties must be construed in accord
with "well established principle that penal statutes are to be construed strictly").
In his concurring opinion in Northwestern Bell, Justice Scalia relied on American
Broadcasting for the proposition that a statute which has both criminal and civil
applications "must, even in its civil applications, possess the degree of certainty
required for criminal laws." H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S.
229, 255 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing FCC v. American Broadcasting
Co., 347 U.S. 284, 296 (1954)).
103. United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32 (1963)
(strong presumptive validity attaches to acts of Congress). The Court has "con-
sistently sought an interpretation which supports the constitutionality of legisla-
tion." Id.; see also Note, Void For Vagueness, supra note 17, at 510 ("very few
federal statutes have been overturned on vagueness grounds").
104. See, e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 116 (1974) (rejecting
vagueness challenge to federal statute in light of prior judicial construction of
phrase "obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile");Jordan v. DeGeorge,
341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951) (rejecting vagueness challenge to federal statute in
light of prior federal and state court interpretations of phrase "crime involving
moral turpitude"); cf Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 22 (1973) ("For the
purpose of determining whether a state statute is too vague and indefinite to
constitute valid legislation 'we must take the statute as though it read precisely
as the highest court of the State has interpreted it.' " (quoting Minnesota ex rel.
Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 273 (1940))).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 71, (1971) (relying on
dictionary definition of "health" in concluding that abortion law was not uncon-
stitutionally vague); see also Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 49 (1975) ("Even trained
lawyers may find it necessary to consult legal dictionaries ... before they may say
with any certainty what some statutes may compel or forbid.").
106. See, e.g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 383-84 (1964) (rejecting
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under the guise of interpretation, rather than invalidate it as violative of
the Constitution.10 7
III. THE VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS DOCTRINE APPLIED
A. Supreme Court Cases
1. Cases Involving the RICO Pattern Requirement
The Supreme Court has not yet explicitly applied the void-for-
vagueness doctrine to RICO's pattern requirement. In fact, the Court
has so far declined the opportunity to hear cases in which the void-for-
vagueness challenge to the pattern requirement was raised.' 0 8 Never-
theless, in the RICO cases that it has heard, the Supreme Court has ap-
plied many of the same clarifying techniques that it would apply if
confronted with an explicit vagueness challenge. For example, in North-
western Bell, the Court resorted to legislative history,' 0 9 prior judicial
construction,' 1 0 external standards' I and other statutes 1 2 to interpret
RICO's pattern requirement. The culmination of the Court's efforts is
the continuity plus relationship formula.' 3
2. Cases Involving Analogous State Statutes
Although the Supreme Court has not yet faced a constitutional chal-
lenge to RICO's pattern requirement, the Court has considered vague-
ness challenges to state statutes in two somewhat analogous cases.1 14
As explained in the sections that follow, however, both cases are
distinguishable.
vagueness challenge to statue after noting that Court had "found that other stat-
utes using similar language were not vague").
107. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 98 (1945) (Court prefers nar-
rower interpretation of legislation that favors statute's constitutionality); Note,
supra note 85, at 86 ("Where a contention of vagueness is advanced with regard
to federal legislation, of course, the Court may narrowly interpret the act...
rather than void it, and there has been a significant tendency to adopt this nar-
rowing, rather than annihilating course." (footnotes omitted)).
108. See, e.g., United States v. Masters, 924 F.2d 1362 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
11 S. Ct. 2019 (1991); United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084 (3rd Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2009-11 (1991); United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d
1169 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, Il1 S. Ct. 130 (1990).
109. See HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239-42
(1989).
110. See id. at 237 (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496
n.14 (1985)).
111. See id. at 238 (quoting 11 OXFORD ENcLISH DICTIONARY 357 (2d ed.
1989)).
112. See id. at 240 (quoting definition of pattern from RICO's sister statute).
113. For a discussion of the continuity plus relationship formula, see supra
notes 65-76 and accompanying text.
114. See Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46 (1989); Lanzetta v.
NewJersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
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a. Lanzelta v. New Jersey
In Lanzetta v. New Jersey," 1 5 a case cited by commentators who con-
tend that RICO's pattern requirement is unconstitutional, the Court
held that the term "gang" as used in a New Jersey statute was unconsti-
tutionally vague.' 1 6 A number of similarities exist between the vague-
ness challenge in Lanzetta and a potential constitutional challenge to
RICO. As with RICO, a primary purpose of the New Jersey statute was
to combat "the pursuit of criminal enterprises."' "17 As with RICO, the
New Jersey statute was predicated on the defendant's commission of
prior criminal acts." 18 Finally, as with RICO, the challenged provision
in the New Jersey statute was not exhaustively defined." 9 Instead, as
with RICO, the NewJersey statute contained minimum requirements for
meeting the challenged provision. 120 These similarities have prompted
some commentators to argue that the Supreme Court ultimately will
hold that the term "pattern" in RICO is unconstitutionally vague just as
the Court held that the term "gang" in the New Jersey statute was un-
constitutionally vague.12 '
Despite these apparent similarities, however, a number of crucial
differences exist that preclude reliance on Lanzetta as controlling prece-
dent in a constitutional challenge to RICO's pattern requirement. First,
unlike the NewJersey statute involved in Lanzella, RICO does not impact
115. 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
116. Id- at 458 (word "gang" is "so vague, indefinite and uncertain that it
must be condemned as repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment"). At least one commentator has pointed out the numerous simi-
larities between Lanzetta and any potential constitutional challenge to RICO's
pattern requirement. See Rakoff, The Unconstitutionality of RICO, N.Y.Lj.,Jan. 11,
1990, at 3 & nn.13-20, col. 2 (arguing RICO's pattern requirement unconstitu-
tionally vague).
117. See Lanzetta, 306 U.S. at 455. Compare id. ("The evident aim of this
provision was to render penal the association of criminals for the pursuit of
criminal enterprises; that is the gist of the legislative expression.") with 18
U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988) ("It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or
associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, inter-
state or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in
the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity
or collection of unlawful debt.").
118. See Lanzetta, 306 U.S. at 452. Compare id. ("Any person ... who has
been convicted at least three times of being a disorderly person, or who has
been convicted of any crime in this or another state is declared to be a gangster
.....") with 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988) (" 'Pattern of racketeering activity' re-
quires at least two acts of racketeering activity . . ").
119. See Lanzetta, 306 U.S. at 453-55. Compare id. at 453 ("The phrase 'con-
sisting of two or more persons' is all that purports to define 'gang.' ") with HJ.
Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 238 (1989) ("Section 1961(5)
concerns only the minimum number of predicates necessary to establish pattern;
and it assumes that there is something to a RICO pattern beyond simply the
number of predicate acts involved.").
120. See Lanzetta, 306 U.S. at 433-35.
121. Rakoff, supra note 116, at 3, col. 2.
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necessarily on first amendment rights to freedom of association. 122 For
this reason, the Court may be less likely to find RICO's pattern require-
ment unconstitutional. Second, unlike the state statute involved in
Lanzetta, RICO is a federal statute. Accordingly, in recognition of the
strong presumption of validity afforded to federal statutes, the federal
courts would be more disposed to "narrow" RICO, albeit under the
guise of interpretation, than to invalidate it.12 3 Third, unlike the New
Jersey statute, RICO is subject to a "check" on prosecutorial discretion
in its criminal applications and in any civil applications brought by the
government. This check on RICO is provided by the Department ofJus-
tice's self-imposed requirement that each proposed civil or criminal
RICO prosecution be submitted to the Organized Crime and Racketeer-
ing Section for review and approval. 124 The internal guidelines gov-
erning whether a RICO charge will be approved are fairly stringent. 125
122. The prohibited conduct in Lanzetta was membership in a "gang."
Lanzetta, 306 U.S. at 452. Consequently, the first amendment rights of individu-
als to associate with each other were necessarily implicated in each and every
violation. In contrast, the prohibited conduct in RICO is engaging in a pattern
of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988). Accordingly, violations of
RICO may, but do not necessarily, implicate first amendment rights. For exam-
ples of cases where RICO violations were alleged to implicate first amendment
rights, see supra note 97.
123. The Supreme Court is reluctant to strike down federal statutes as un-
constitutionally vague. This reluctance is evidenced in the strong presumption
of validity which it affords to acts of Congress. See United States v. National
Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32 (1963) (rejecting vagueness challenge to
federal law prohibiting sales "at unreasonably low prices for the purpose of de-
stroying competition" as applied to sales made below cost, without legitimate
objective and with intent to destroy competition). For a discussion of the
Supreme Court's preference for narrowing federal statutes rather than finding
them invalid, see supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
124. CRIMINAL Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S
MANUAL § 9-110.320 (1989) [hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL] ("No crimi-
nal or civil prosecution ... shall be commenced or issued under the RICO stat-
ute without the prior approval of .the Organized Crime and Racketeering
Section, Criminal Division."), reprinted in THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL
9-2134 to 35 (P-H 1991); see also id. § 9-110.101 ("No RICO criminal indictment
or civil complaint shall be filed.., without the prior approval of the Criminal
Division."), reprinted in THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL 9-2131 (P-H 1991).
125. See RICO MANUAL, supra note 15, at 53-69, reprinted in THE DEPART-
MENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL 9-2176.85 to .101 (P-H 1991). For example, the De-
partment of Justice professes to "take[] a strict[er] approach to the single-
episode rule... than the requirements set forth in [Northwestern Bell]." Id. at 61.
Thus, "a proposed RICO count will not be approved that contains more than
one predicate act arising from a single criminal episode." Id. at 63. Addition-
ally, "[in a mail fraud case, the pattern generally will not be approved if multi-
ple mailings in furtherance of a single scheme to defraud are charged as separate
racketeering acts, unless the scheme resulted in multiple harms." Id.
Similarly, the preface to the United States Attorney's Manual section setting
forth the review procedure explains that
not every case in which technically the elements of a RICO violation
exist, will result in the approval of a charge. Further, it is not the policy
of the Criminal Division to approve "imaginative" prosecutions under
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The existence and rigorous application of the review procedure lessen
the possibility that federal prosecutors will pursue "frivolous" RICO ac-
tions. 126 At the same time, the lesser chance of an abuse of discretion
increases the likelihood that the courts will find RICO constitutional.
Fourth, unlike the term "gang" that was challenged in Lanzetta, for
which there was no statutory definition, 12 7 the term "pattern" is used
and defined in one of RICO's sister statutes. 128 Finally, unlike the term
"gang" in the New Jersey statute, the Supreme Court has already pro-
vided guidance as to the proper interpretation of the term "pattern" in
RICO.' 29 Consequently, although the facts in Lanzetta may, at first
blush, appear remarkably similar to a constitutional challenge to RICO's
pattern requirement, a closer examination reveals that Lanzetta is easily
distinguishable and, therefore, of little or no precedential value in pre-
dicting the Court's ultimate decision.
b. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana
In Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana,'5 0 the Supreme Court rejected a
vagueness challenge to the pattern requirement in Indiana's state anti-
racketeering law.'13 The state law at issue in Fort Wayne, however, con-
tained a different, and arguably more precise, definition of "pattern"
RICO which are far afield from the congressional purpose of the RICO
statute....
Further, it should be noted that only in exceptional circumstances
will approval be granted when RICO is [not sought] ... to attack the
activity which Congress most directly addressed-the infiltration of or-
ganized crime into the nation's economy.
U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL, supra note124, § 9-110.200, reprinted in THE DEPART-
MENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL 9-2132 (P-H 1991).
126. The success of the review procedure is also evidenced by the fact that
less than two percent of the first 800 cases approved by the Department ofJus-
tice purportedly contained legal defects. Dennis, supra note 31, 654 & n.29. The
statute in Lanzetta apparently contained no such check on prosecutorial discre-
tion. See Lanzetta, 306 U.S. at 451.
127. Lanzetta, 306 U.S. at 455 (term "gang" not defined in statute in ques-
tion, nor is there "any other statute attempting to make it criminal to be a mem-
ber of a 'gang' ").
128. For a discussion of the definition of the term "pattern" contained in
the Dangerous Special Offender Sentencing Act, Title X of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1982) (repealed 1987), seesupra note
52 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court recognized in Sedima that the
Title X pattern definition might aid courts interpreting RICO's pattern require-
ment. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985).
129. See HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 237-43
(1989) (expounding relationship and continuity test for pattern); Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985) (setting forth continuity
plus relationship test for pattern). For a discussion of the guidance already pro-
vided by the Supreme Court as to the meaning of RICO's pattern requirement,
see supra notes 46-84 and accompanying text.
130. 489 U.S. 46 (1989).
131. Id. at 58.
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than does RICO. 132 For that reason, it does not necessarily follow that
the Justices who rejected the vagueness challenge to the state statute in
Fort Wayne would also reject a vagueness challenge to the federal RICO
statute.
Conversely, for several reasons, it does not necessarily follow that
the dissenting Justices in Fort Wayne ultimately will vote to find RICO's
pattern requirement unconstitutionally vague. First, Justice Brennan,
one of the dissenters in Fort Wayne, 33 later authored the majority opin-
ion in Northwestern Bell, in which the Court professed to establish a
"meaningful concept of pattern."' 3 4 Although Justice Brennan has
since retired, the very fact that he authored the majority opinion in
Northwestern Bell after dissenting in Fort Wayne discredits any argument
that those Justices who dissented in Fort Wayne will ultimately vote that
RICO's pattern requirement is unconstitutionally vague. Second, Jus-
tice Stevens, who authored the Fort Wayne dissenting opinion, has a well-
known history of dissenting in virtually all cases, such as Fort Wayne,
where the majority upholds a statute regulating "obscenity."'135 Conse-
quently, it is likely that Justice Stevens would have dissented in Fort
132. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-6-1 (West 1986). The Indiana statute
provides:
'Pattern of racketeering activity' means engaging in at least two (2) inci-
dents of racketeering activity that have the same or similiar intent, re-
sult, accomplice, victim, or method of commission, or are otherwise
interrelated by distinguishing characteristics [sic] that are not isolated
incidents. However, the incidents are a pattern of racketeering activity
only if at least one (1) of the incidents occurred after August 31, 1980,
and if the last incident occured within five (5) years after a prior inci-
dent of racketeering activity.
Id. (emphasis added).
In contrast, the federal RICO statute does not expressly define what its pat-
tern requirement "means." Instead, the statute provides that a "'pattern of
racketeering activity' requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of
which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which oc-
curred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the com-
mission of a prior act of racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988)
(emphasis added). As interpreted by the Court, federal RICO's pattern require-
ment "means" at least two acts of racketeering activity which are both related
(by having the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or meth-
ods of commission, or by otherwise being interrelated by distinguishing charac-
teristics and by not being isolated events) and continuous (by being repeated
within a closed period or by being conduct that by its nature projects into the
future with the threat of repetition).
For a discussion of the method used by many states to simplify the interpre-
tation of the pattern requirements in their state anti-racketeering statutes, see
supra notes 291-305 and accompanying text.
133. Fort Wayne, 489 U.S. at 70 (Stevens, J. dissenting, joined by Justice
Brennan).
134. See Northwestern Bell, 492 U.S. at 232.
135. See Fort W4ayne, 489 U.S. at 76 n.15 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("It long
has been 'my conviction that government may not constitutionally criminalize
mere possession or sale of obscene literature, absent some connection to minors
or obtrusive display to unconsenting adults.' ").
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Wayne regardless of any vagueness challenge. Third, a careful reading of
the dissenting opinion in Fort Wayne reveals that it was not premised on
any "vagueness" in the definition of pattern. On the contrary, the dis-
senters implicitly recognized that the pattern requirement was clearly
defined,'8 6 but appeared to object to the breadth of the statute.13 7
Therefore, Fort Wayne, like Lanzetta, is of little value in predicting how
the Court will ultimately decide a constitutional challenge to RICO's
pattern requirement.
B. Lower Federal Court Cases
In the two and one-half years since the Supreme Court's decision in
Northwestern Bell, defendants in newly filed and pending RICO cases have
eagerly accepted Justice Scalia's invitation to challenge the constitution-
ality of RICO's pattern requirement. Lower federal courts have ad-
dressed the challenge in a variety of criminal and civil cases. In all but
one of those cases, 38 the courts have rejected the vagueness challenge.
In reaching this common result, however, some courts have explained
their analyses in greater detail than other courts.
1. Approaches Taken by Post-Northwestern Bell Courts
Most courts that have considered the constitutional challenge to
RICO's pattern requirement after Northwestern Bell have followed one of
three basic approaches. The major difference among these approaches
is the extent of analysis that appears in the court's opinion. Courts fol-
lowing the first approach have, with little or no discussion, simply re-
jected the argument that RICO's pattern requirement is
unconstitutionally vague.13 9 These courts generally take the position
136. Id. at 73 (Stevens, J. dissenting) ("A person who commits two [sales of
obscene magazines] ... engages in a 'pattern of racketeering activity' as defined
in the State's RICO statute.").
137. Id. at 83-84 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe Indiana Legislature's in-
tent in making obscenity a RICO predicate offense is to expand beyond tradi-
tional prosecution of legally obscene materials into restriction of materials that,
though constitutionally protected, have the same undesired effect on the com-
munity's morals as those that are actually obscene. Fulfillment of that intent
surely would overflow the boundaries imposed by the Constitution." (footnote
omitted)). Overbreadth, a separate constitutional infirmity, is distinguished
from vagueness in that it invalidates laws that regulate behavior that is constitu-
tionally protected. Vagueness, on the other hand, invalidates statutes that lack
the requisite clarity to provide guidance. Consequently, a law may be overbroad
without failing to provide guidance, and a law may be vague without impacting
on constitutionally protected conduct. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497 (1982). For a discussion of the differ-
ences between the void-for-vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, see supra note
85.
138. See Firestone v. Galbreath, 747 F. Supp. 1556, 1581 (S.D. Ohio 1990)(holding RICO unconstitutionally vague both as applied and as written).
139. See, e.g., Norstar Bank v. Pepitone, 742 F. Supp. 1209, 1213 (E.D.N.Y.
1990) (court would be presumptuous to hold RICO statute unconstitutional in
30
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 6 [1991], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol36/iss6/8
1991] COMMENT 1727
that the constitutionality of the pattern requirement was definitively set-
tled when early constitutional challenges to the pattern requirement
were rejected in cases decided prior to Northwestern Bell.140 A number of
these courts also note that the Supreme Court's decisions in Sedima and
Northwestern Bell have made RICO's pattern requirement clearer than
when the earlier vagueness challenges were rejected.141
Courts following the second approach begin their analyses by con-
sidering whether any first amendment rights are involved in the case.
1 42
Invariably, no first amendment rights are involved and, therefore, the
defendant cannot challenge the facial validity of the pattern require-
ment.1 4 3 These courts then note that the question to be answered is:
"Would a person of ordinary intelligence in the defendant's position
have notice that the acts charged would constitute a pattern of racke-
light of available legislative history, regardless of Justice Scalia's concurrence);
Aldridge v. Lily-Tulip, Inc. Salary Retirement Plan Benefits Comm., 741 F.
Supp. 906, 910 n.5 (S.D. Ga. 1990) (summarily concluding in footnote that
RICO's pattern requirement is not unconstitutional), aff'd inpart and rev'd inpart,
953 F.2d 587 (11 th Cir. 1992); United States v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 741 F.
Supp. 334, 342 (D. Conn. 1990) (declining to hold RICO's pattern requirement
unconstitutional after review of other court decisions upholding statute as con-
stitutional); In re Par Pharmaceutical, Inc., Sec. Litig., 733 F. Supp. 668, 682 n.15
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (declining to hold RICO's pattern requirement unconstitutional
in light of numerous decisions by other courts upholding statute as constitu-
tional); United States v. Keller, 730 F. Supp. 151, 156 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (without
discussion, declining to hold RICO's pattern requirement unconstitutionally
vague); Wellington Int'l Commerce Corp. v. Retelny, 727 F. Supp. 843, 846
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (same); United States v. Regan, 726 F. Supp. 447,452 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (court need not "linger" on claim that RICO's pattern requirement un-
constitutionally vague); United States v. Butler, 704 F. Supp. 1338, 1345 (E.D.
Va. 1989) (rejecting argument that RICO unconstitutionally vague after noting
that RICO has withstood numerous constitutional challenges), aff'd, 905 F.2d
1532 (4th Cir.) (table), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 257 (1990).
140. See, e.g., United States v. Pacionne, 738 F. Supp. 691,698-99 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) ("specific allegations in the indictment.., and settled precedent" estab-
lish that RICO is not unconstitutionally vague as applied in case before court).
141. See, e.g., United States v. Gigante, 737 F. Supp. 292, 294 (D.NJ. 1990)
("[Northwestern Bell] provides further guidance, not less, to the lower courts con-
cerning the facts necessary to establish a 'pattern of racketeering activity.' ").
142. See, e.g., United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1104 (3d Cir.
1990) (no first amendment concerns, therefore, defendant may only attack stat-
ute as applied to his circumstances), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2009-11 (1991);
United States v. Quintanilla, 760 F. Supp. 687, 693 (N.D. Il. 1991) (same).
143. Defendants often argue that first amendment rights are implicated so
that they can challenge the facial validity of the statute, rather than simply its
application to the facts of their case. See, e.g., United States v. Busacca, 739 F.
Supp. 370, 378 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (rejecting defendant's argument that first
amendment rights were implicated in case and then rejecting constitutional chal-
lenge after concluding that defendant failed to establish that RICO was uncon-
stitutional as applied to him), aff'd, 936 F.2d 232 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
595 (1991). For a discussion of how first amendment concerns permit a defend-
ant to challenge the facial validity of a statute, see supra notes 96-97 and accom-
panying text.
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teering?"' 144 Courts following the second approach then conclude, with
little or no express consideration of relationship or continuity, that a
person of ordinary intelligence in the defendant's position would have
known that his acts constituted a pattern and were, therefore, proscribed
by RICO.145 Many of the cases in which courts follow this second ap-
proach involve "traditional" organized criminal activity.146
Courts following the third approach begin their analyses in the
same manner as courts following the second approach. After posing the
question of whether a person in the defendant's position would know
that his acts constitute a pattern, however, courts following the third
approach expressly apply the continuity plus relationship test espoused
by the Supreme Court in Northwestern Bell. 147 If the court finds that the
defendant engaged in predicate acts which were both continuous and
related, the court then concludes that the defendant had ample notice
that his conduct constituted a pattern and was proscribed by RICO.148
This third approach displays the most extensive analysis and is the ap-
proach most overtly consistent with the Supreme Court's discussion of
pattern in Northwestern Bell.
2. Decisions Rendered by Post-Northwestern Bell Courts
Although post-Northwestern Bell courts appear to have employed dif-
ferent approaches in their analyses, they have been virtually uniform in
rejecting constitutional challenges to RICO's pattern requirement in a
wide variety of cases. The decisions of these courts can be segregated
into three categories based on the nature of the case: (I) criminal prose-
cutions involving traditional organized crime; (2) all other criminal pros-
ecutions; and (3) civil actions.' 49 The following sections briefly review
144. See, e.g., Pungitore, 910 F.2d at 1104 ("inquiry must focus on whether
persons of ordinary intelligence would know that the repeated commission of
murder, extortion, illegal gambling, and usury offenses in furtherance of an or-
ganized crime enterprise constitute a pattern of racketeering under RICO");
Quintanilla, 760 F. Supp. at 693 (rejecting vagueness challenge because defend-
ant failed to establish that "an ordinary person in [defendant's] position" would
not "know that continuous and related acts of mail fraud, wire fraud and embez-
zlement amount to a 'pattern of racketeering activity' ").
145. See, e.g., United States v. Masters, 924 F.2d 1362, 1367 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2019 (1991); United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1179-80
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 130 (1990).
146. See, e.g., Masters, 924 F.2d 1362; Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169. But see
Pungitore, 910 F.2d at 1104 (applying relationship and continuity factors in case
involving traditional organized crime).
147. See, e.g., Pungitore, 910 F.2d at 1104; Quintanilla, 760 F. Supp. at 692-
93; United States v. Lobue, 751 F. Supp. 748, 754 (N.D. Il1. 1990); United States
v. Andrews, 749 F. Supp. 1520, 1523-24 (N.D. 11. 1990).
148. It may be argued that courts following the second approach also apply
the continuity plus relationship test, but do so "silently." Thus, the third ap-
proach may be implicit in the second approach, at least in the decisions of some
courts.
149. This Comment confines its analysis primarily to post-Northwestern Bell
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the cases in which federal courts have addressed the constitutional chal-
lenge to RICO's pattern requirement. While no strong correlation ap-
pears between the approach employed by the court and the nature of
the case involved, one pattern has clearly emerged-courts consistently
reject the vagueness challenge.' 50
a. Criminal Cases Involving Traditional Organized Crime
In the criminal context, a number of United States Courts of Ap-
peals have considered and rejected constitutional challenges to RICO's
pattern requirement in cases in which the defendant raising the chal-
lenge was charged with multiple predicate acts on behalf of traditional
organized crime. These courts have evidenced little difficulty in reason-
ing that the defendants had fair notice that their conduct constituted a
pattern of racketeering activity and was prohibited by RICO.' 5 '
United States v. Angiulo 152 was the first post-Northwestern Bell case in
which a federal court of appeals addressed a constitutional challenge to
RICO's pattern requirement. In Angiulo, the defendants were members
of an organized crime family operating in Massachusetts.' 1 The predi-
cate acts underlying the RICO charges included illegal gambling, extor-
tionate credit transactions and murder conspiracies.1 5 4 The Angiulo
defendants argued that Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Northwest-
ern Bell required a finding that RICO's pattern requirement was void for
vagueness. 155
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit began by
noting that no first amendment considerations were involved in the
cases in which federal courts have addressed constitutional challenges to the
pattern requirement. Other commentators have analyzed this same topic by re-
viewing the approaches followed by each of the circuit courts of appeals in ap-
plying the pattern requirement. See Kelley, supra note 65, at 349-70 (discussing
inconsistent interpretations of pattern by the courts of appeals); Note, Has the
Constituency of Continuity Plus Relationship"Put an End to RICO'S Pattern of Confusion?,
18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 201, 213-40 (1991) (reviewing interpretations of pattern by
the courts of appeals).
150. But see Firestone v. Galbreath, 747 F. Supp. 1556 (S.D. Ohio 1990)
(finding RICO unconstitutionally vague as applied and on its face).
151. In some of these cases, the court simply summarily rejected the argu-
ment that the pattern requirement was unconstitutional. See, e.g., United States
v. Van Dorn, 925 F.2d 1331, 1334 n.2 (11th Cir. 1991) (summarily rejecting
argument that RICO's pattern requirement was unconstitutionally vague in
prosecution where defendants charged with crimes on behalf of organized crime
family).
152. 897 F.2d 1169, 1180 (1st Cir.) (holding RICO constitutional in tradi-
tional organized crime setting because person of ordinary intelligence would
know organized crime activity fell within pattern requirement), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 130 (1990).
153. Id. at 1176.
154. Id at 1176-77.
155. Id. at 1179.
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Angiulo case. 156 The court then unequivocally rejected the defendants'
vagueness challenge, stating that "if anything is clear about RICO, it is
that 'a pattern of racketeering activity' is intended to encompass the ac-
tivities of organized crime families."' 157 The court acknowledged, how-
ever, "that potential uncertainty exists regarding the precise reach of
RICO's 'pattern of racketeering' element."' 58 Consequently, the court
noted that it was not expressing any opinion as to whether RICO's pat-
tern requirement might be unconstitutionally vague in a non-organized
crime context.' 59
In United States v. Coiro,1 60 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit considered and rejected a constitutional challenge to
RICO's pattern requirement that was raised by an attorney charged with
bribery and money laundering on behalf of members of an organized
crime family.' 61 The Second Circuit found that, notwithstandingJustice
Scalia's concurring opinion in Northwestern Bell, "RICO was plainly in-
tended to encompass the illegal activities of organized crime." 162 The
court was "confident that the statute provided [the defendant] with fair
notice that his contemplated conduct ... fell within RICO's strictures,
and thus the statute [was] not unconstitutionally vague as applied to
him." 163 Because Coiro did not involve any first amendment considera-
tions, the Second Circuit confined its constitutional inquiry to the facts
in the case before it and did not resolve whether RICO would be uncon-
stitutional as applied in other circumstances.1 64
Similarly, in United States v. Pungitore,165 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected the void-for-vagueness challenge
raised by "Mafia" defendants in a criminal RICO prosecution.1 66 The
pattern in Pungitore consisted of criminal acts including murder, extor-
tion, gambling and loansharking. 167 The court noted that, because the
challenge was not based on first amendment issues, the defendants were
required to establish that the statute was unconstitutionally vague as ap-
plied to their particular factual circumstances.' 68 Thus, the court next
considered whether persons of ordinary intelligence would know that




159. Id. at 1180.
160. 922 F.2d 1008 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2826 (1991).
161. Id. at 1010.
162. Id. at 1017.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. 910 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2009-11 (1991).
166. Id. at 1103.
167. Id. at 1104.
168. Id. For a discussion of the void-for-vagueness doctrine in the first
amendment context, see supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
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teering under RICO. 169
To determine whether a pattern of racketeering existed, the Third
Circuit applied the continuity plus relationship test set forth by the
Supreme Court in Sedima and elaborated upon in Northwestern Bell.170
The court held that the requirement of continuity was satisfied because
the "criminal conduct.., was not isolated but extended over a substan-
tial time." 171 The court next found that the requirement of relationship
was also met because the criminal acts were "committed pursuant to the
orders of key members of the enterprise" and were carried out "in fur-
therance of [the enterprise's] affairs."' 72 The court concluded that the
"appellants' argument that they lacked notice that their conduct consti-
tuted a 'pattern' under RICO [was] utterly devoid of merit, as they ha[d]
engaged in a classic pattern of racketeering under RICO."17 3
In rejecting the defendants' reliance onJustice Scalia's concurrence
in Northwestern Bell, the Third Circuit held that the potential vagueness
problems envisioned by Justice Scalia simply did not exist in
Pungitore.174 Instead, the court likened Pungitore to Angiulo, where the
First Circuit had rejected a similar constitutional challenge.' 7 5 The
Third Circuit stressed that neither Pungitore nor Angiulo involved corrup-
tion in "legitimate businesses."' 76 Instead, in both cases, RICO was ap-
plied to a pattern comporting with the traditional conception of
organized crime. 177 The court found that, "however vague the statute
169. Pungitore, 910 F.2d at 1104. The court explained that if it found that
persons of ordinary intelligence would know that repeated commission of such
acts constituted a pattern under RICO it "need not further consider whether the
pattern requirement is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the hypothetical
conduct of third parties not before [the court], as appellants lack standing to
assert the rights of those third parties." Id.
170. Id. For a discussion of the continuity plus relationship test, see supra
notes 62-84 and accompanying text.
171. Pungitore, 910 F.2d at 1104. The criminal conspiracy involved in
Pungitore was alleged to have run from April, 1976 through October, 1987. Id. at
1099.
172. Id at 1104. The court noted that "the independent existence of the
enterprise connotes continuity and relatedness because the evidence showed
overwhelmingly that the criminal agenda of the enterprise extended beyond the
commission of any individual predicate acts." Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1105.
175. Id. at 1104-05;seeAngiulo, 897 F.2d at 1176, 1179-80. Fora discussion
of Angiulo, see supra notes 152-59 and accompanying text.
176. Pungitore, 910 F.2d at 1104-05. The court contrasted the fact patterns
of Angiulo and Pungitore to that of Northwestern Bell, the case in which Justice Scalia
issued his "invitation" to challenge the constitutionality of RICO's pattern re-
quirement, noting that Northwestern Bell "involved allegations of corruption
within the ranks of a legitimate business." Id. at 1105.
177. Id. In using the term "organized crime," the Third Circuit was appar-
ently referring to the concept of "the archetypal intimidating mobster" referred
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may be as applied to legitimate businesses, its application to the criminal
activities of organized crime families is so clear as to be beyond perad-
venture." 178 Finally, although the Third Circuit "doubt[ed] that a suc-
cessful vagueness challenge to RICO ever could be raised by defendants
in an organized crime case," v179 the court declined to rule out the possi-
bility that a constitutional challenge to RICO in a civil case (or possibly a
criminal case not involving organized crime) might be successful.'8 0
United States v. Andrews' 8 1 involved a different level of organized
crime than did Angiulo, Coiro or Pungitore. In Andrews, a federal district
court rejected a constitutional challenge to RICO's pattern requirement
that was advanced by six members of a street gang involved in narcotics
distribution.' 8 2 In support of their drug dealing activities, members of
the street gang committed twenty murders and were involved in twelve
attempted murders.' 83 The district court summarily rejected the de-
fendants' challenge to the facial validity of the RICO pattern require-
ment because no first amendment considerations were involved. 18 4 The
court then considered whether the statute was unconstitutionally vague
as applied to the defendants' particular circumstances.185 The court
found that persons of ordinary intelligence would know that the require-
ment of relationship was satisfied because the predicate acts were "heav-
ily intertwined" with the affairs of a gang that was "a wholly criminal
organization."' 8 6 The court found that persons of ordinary intelligence
would know that the continuity requirement was satisfied because the
defendants had each been associated for a number of years with a street
gang that had been in existence for over twenty years.' 8 7 Therefore, the
Andrews court rejected the defendants' constitutional challenge.' 88
United States v. Masters'8 9 involved neither a traditional organized
178. Pungitore, 910 F.2d at 1104.
179. Id. at 1105.
180. Id. In fact, the Pungitore court cited with apparent approval an article
that suggested the "vagueness problem" referenced by Justice Scalia may be
more pronounced in civil RICO cases. Id. (citing Freeman & McSlarrow, supra
note 88, at 1009 (arguing that RICO's pattern requirement i§ unconstitutionally
vague)).
181. 749 F. Supp. 1520 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
182. Id. at 1520, 1524.
183. Id. at 1521.
184. Id. at 1522-23.
185. Id. at 1523-24.
186. Id. at 1524.
187. Id.
188. Id. The same district court that decided Andrews later reached the
same result in a very similar case involving another street gang. See United
States v. Infelise, No. 90 CR 87, 1991 WL 159126 at *I (N.D. Il. July 25, 1991)(rejecting vagueness challenge to RICO's pattern requirement in light of the
decisions of various courts of appeal rejecting vagueness challenge in cases in-
volving traditional organized crime families).
189. 924 F.2d 1362 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2019 (1991).
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crime context nor a street gang, but the case did involve a wholly illegal
criminal enterprise.' 90 The members of the enterprise in Masters were
an attorney and two police officers. 19 1 Over several years, the police
officers referred criminals to the attorney in return for bribes. 192 The
attorney also acted as a conduit to funnel money from illegal bookmak-
ers to the two police officers. l93 The alleged predicate acts included
bribery, criminal solicitation and, ultimately, the murder of the attor-
ney's estranged wife.' 94 The Seventh Circuit gave alternative bases for
rejecting the defendants' argument that RICO's pattern of racketeering
requirement was unconstitutionally vague. 195 First, the court relied on
the Supreme Court's decision in Fort Wayne in holding that the pattern
of racketeering requirement would never be unconstitutionally vague
unless the statutes that criminalized the underlying predicate acts were
vague.19 6 Alternatively, the court found that the pattern of racketeering
requirement would not be unconstitutionally vague when applied to en-
terprises engaged in wholly illegal conduct.' 97 The Master's court did
not expressly apply the continuity plus relationship test.
As the aforementioned cases illustrate, courts have had little diffi-
culty rejecting constitutional challenges to RICO's pattern requirement
in cases involving a traditional organized crime context or a wholly ille-
gal enterprise. The Coiro, Angiulo and Masters courts reached this result
without expressly applying the continuity plus relationship test set forth
by the Supreme Court in Northwestern Bell.198 The First, Second and
Seventh Circuits simply found it inconceivable that a defendant in an
organized crime context would not have fair notice that his conduct was
proscribed by RICO. The Third Circuit, in Pungitore, also found it highly
unlikely that RICO's pattern requirement would ever be found vague in
a traditional organized crime context, but the court did so after finding
that the defendants' acts were both continuous and related.199 The dis-
trict court in Andrews also applied the continuity plus relationship
190. The Masters court referred to the enterprise involved in the case as a
"miniature suburban mafia." Id. at 1367.
191. Id at 1365.
192. Id
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1365-66.
195. Id. at 1367.
196. Id. (citing Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46 (1989)). As
discussed earlier in this Comment, reliance on the Supreme Courts' Fort Wayne
decision in addressing a challenge to RICO's pattern requirement is misplaced.
See supra notes 130-37 and accompanying text.
197. Masters, 924 F.2d at 1367.
198. See United States v. Coiro, 922 F.2d 1008, 1016-17 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 111 S. Ct. 2826 (1991); United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1180 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 130 (1990).
199. See United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1104 (3rd Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2009-11 (1991).
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test. 200
Although the courts' analyses differed somewhat, there are similari-
ties among the five cases. In each case, the defendant tried to challenge
the facial validity of the statute. Each court responded by finding the
case involved no first amendment considerations and, therefore, the
court only permitted the defendant to challenge the statute's constitu-
tionality as applied to the defendant's particular factual circumstances.
Then, after rejecting the defendant's constitutional challenge, each
court expressly noted that it was not ruling out the possibility that
RICO's pattern requirement might be unconstitutionally vague in cer-
tain applications.
b. Criminal Cases Not Involving Traditional Organized Crime
The preceding section illustrated that courts have unanimously re-
jected the constitutional challenge to RICO's pattern requirement in
cases involving traditional organized crime and wholly illegal enter-
prises. As this section reveals, no federal court to date has found
RICO's pattern requirement unconstitutionally vague in any other crim-
inal case, even where the case involved legitimate businesses engaged in
criminal conduct.
i. Political Corruption
In United States v. .Woods, 2 01 the Third Circuit faced a constitutional
challenge to RICO's pattern requirement in a political corruption
case. 20 2 One defendant in Woods was a politician.20 3 The other two de-
fendants, a corporation and the president of the corporation, bribed the
politician to receive contracts from the City of Pittsburgh.20 4 The court
found that the acts of bribery over four years were related, "given the
... methods, goals, results and identity of the parties." 20 5 The court
then found that the acts were continuous "given the substantial period
200. Andrews, 749 F. Sup. at 1522 (" 'continuity plus relationship'... estab-
lishes 'pattern' "). The Andrews court is within the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit. In a subsequent decision, however, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected a vagueness challenge
to RICO's pattern requirement without focusing on either relationship or con-
tinuity. See United States v. Masters, 924 F.2d 1362 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 2019 (1991). In Masters, the Seventh Circuit took an approach similar to the
First and Second Circuits. Namely, the court found that RICO was simply not
vague when applied to enterprises engaged in wholly illegal activities. Id. at
1367. For a discussion of Masters, see supra notes 189-97 and accompanying
text.
201. 915 F.2d 854 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1413 (1991).
202. Id. at 854.
203. Id. at 856.
204. Id. at 856-61.
205. Id. at 863-64.
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of time over which the acts were committed."' 20 6 The Third Circuit con-
cluded: "The application of RICO to the activities of these defendants
should not come as a surprise to them. Whatever might be true in other
cases, [RICO] is not unconstitutional when applied in this ongoing,
hardcore political corruption case."'20
7
In another political corruption case, United States v. Lobue,208 two
politicians were charged with bribery and extortion in connection with
the awarding of municipal contracts for garbage disposal and the opera-
tion of a city landfill.20 9 The district court easily rejected the defend-
ants' vagueness challenge after applying the continuity plus relationship
test articulated in Northwestern Bell.2 10 The court found that the acts of
bribery and extortion were related because they were part of the defend-
ants' scheme to profit from their positions as public officials. 2 1 1 The
court found that the acts were continuous because they spanned six
years. 21 2 The court then concluded that the acts constituted "the classic
pattern of racketeering activity" and that the statute was not unconstitu-
tionally vague as applied to the defendants. 213
ii. Judicial Bribery
In United States v. Glecier,2 14 a judicial bribery case, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in a footnote, summarily re-
jected the contention that RICO's pattern requirement was unconstitu-
tionally vague.21 5 The court did not premise its rejection of the
vagueness challenge on the facts of the case before it or on the require-
ments of relationship and continuity. Instead, the court rejected the de-
fendant's constitutional challenge after noting that pre-Northwestern Bell
decisions by various courts of appeals upholding the constitutionality of
the pattern requirement had "settled that issue to [the court's]
satisfaction.",216
iii. Securities Fraud
In United States v. Dempsey,2 17 the district court considered the
vagueness challenge to RICO's pattern requirement in a suit against five
commodities traders who were charged with defrauding customers and
206. Id at 864.
207. Id.
208. 751 F. Supp. 748 (N.D. I11. 1990).
209. Id. at 750-51.




214. 923 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 54 (1991).
215. Id. at 497 n.l.
216. Id.
217. 768 F. Supp. 1256 (N.D. I1. 1990).
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illegally avoiding liability for trading errors.2 18 The court found that the
predicate acts were related because they had the same purpose, victims,
results and methods of commission.2 19 The court found that the acts
were continuous because they extended for over two and one-half
years. 220 The court concluded that "[a] person of ordinary intelligence
would be on notice that more than 200 related predicate acts committed
over a two-and-one-half-year period fall into a 'pattern.' ",221
In United States v. Eisenberg,222 the district court confronted the
vagueness challenge in a prosecution against three defendants for secur-
ities fraud. 228 The district court had "no doubt" that the sixty acts of
wire and mail fraud committed by the defendants over a period of six
years "amounted to a continuous stream of acts of racketeering. '2 24
Thus, the court held that the pattern requirement was not vague as ap-
plied to the defendants. 225
iv. Insurance Fraud
In United States v. Eisen,228 the defendants were charged with bribing
a public servant regarding twenty-three personal injury lawsuits. 227 The
defendants were employed by a particular law firm.228 The Eisen court
agreed with Justice Scalia's concurrence in Northwestern Bell that "the
outer reaches of [RICO's pattern requirement] could do with further
clarification." 229 The court found, however, that the case before it dealt
with the "core" meaning of the statute.230 For that reason, and "given
the defendants' occupations," the court rejected the vagueness
challenge.231
v. Embezzlement
In United States v. Quintanilla,2 3 2 the defendant challenging the con-
stitutionality of the pattern requirement was charged with conspiring
with two other persons to defraud a corporation of over $700,000.2 3
218. Id. at 1260.
219. ld at 1262-63.
220. Id. at 1263.
221. Id.
222. 773 F. Supp. 662 (D.NJ. 1991).
223. Id. at 731.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. CR-90-0018, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14219 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 1990).
227. Id. at *1.
228. Id.
229. Id. at *19.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. 760 F. Supp. 687 (N.D. IM. 1991).
233. Id. at 689-90.
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The defendant was the executive director of a nonprofit organization
that requested and received funds from the corporation to support com-
munity activities.234 Rather than using the monies for community activi-
ties, however, the defendant kept a portion of the money and gave the
rest to his co-conspirators.23 5 Because no first amendment issue was
involved, the court considered only whether the statute was vague as
applied to the defendant.2s6 The court held that the relationship re-
quirement was satisfied because the embezzlement was carried out
through acts of mail fraud and wire fraud that had similar participants,
victims, methods of commission and results.23 7 The court found that
the continuity requirement was satisfied because the acts "occurred over
a substantial period of time."1238 Therefore, the court rejected the de-
fendant's challenge.
The preceding sections demonstrate the willingness of federal
courts uniformly to reject the vagueness challenge to RICO's pattern
requirement in criminal prosecutions. In a number of these cases, how-
ever, the courts expressly declined to hold that the pattern requirement
would be constitutional as applied in a civil action.23 9 The section that
follows reveals that, with one anomalous exception, federal courts have
also uniformly rejected the vagueness challenge in civil cases.
c. Civil Cases
i. Civil Cases Rejecting the Vagueness Challenge
Thus far, only one federal appellate court has expressly considered
the constitutionality of RICO's pattern requirement in a civil case. In
Abell v. Potomac Insurance Co.,240 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit considered the vagueness challenge in a case in which
the defendant was charged with repeatedly using the mails to defraud
over 500 investors of over twelve million dollars. 24' The case was on
remand from the Supreme Court for consideration in light of the
Court's decision in Northwestern Bell.24 2
The Abell court dismissed the defendant's constitutional challenge
as "superficial" after noting that he had engaged in "[a] myriad of fraud-
ulent acts spanning more than six years and involving more than five
234. Id. at 690.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 693.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See, e.g., United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1180 (Ist Cir.), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 130 (1990); United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1105(3rd Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Il1 S. Ct. 2009-11 (1991).
240. 946 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1991).
241. Id. at 1163, 1168.
242. Id. at 1164.
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hundred victims." 243 The court found that the defendant utterly failed
to meet the burden of proving that a person of ordinary intelligence in
the defendant's position would not have known that his acts constituted
a pattern. 244
In Kauffmann v. Yoskowitz, 24 5 the defendant was alleged to have re-
peatedly sold securities to the plaintiff over a three-year period in viola-
tion of federal securities laws. 246 The district court acknowledged that
RICO was "one of the most troublesome federal laws" and that its appli-
cation was "difficult and sometimes confusing." 247 Nevertheless, the
court felt " bound by the implicit, as well as the explicit, conclusions
reached by the majority in [Northwestern Bell] to the effect that, while
flawed, RICO is a valid and utilitarian part of our civil law." 248 Thus,
the court rejected the constitutional challenge.249
In another case involving allegations of securities fraud, Beck v.
Jones,250 an investor brought suit against a stock brokerage firm and an
individual broker for RICO violations involving the sale of securities.
The alleged pattern consisted of only three sales of the securities in
question.2 51 The first sale was made to the plaintiff by the defendant
broker.2 52 The second and third sales were made to two other custom-
ers of the brokerage firm over one year later, after the defendarit broker
was no longer associated with the firm.253 The defendants argued that
they could not have known that three sales by two different brokers over
a year apart would constitute a pattern under RICO. 25 4
The Beck court first addressed the issue of whether RICO was un-
constitutionally vague on its face.255 The court stated:
243. Id. at 1167.
244. Id. The court's next step was somewhat illogical. After having con-
cluded that the defendant should have known that his acts would constitute a
pattern, the court next considered whether the defendant's acts constituted a
pattern. Id. Logically, it would seem that this second question was subsumed in
the first.
245. 85 Civ. 8414 (PKL), 1990 WL 300795 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1990).
246. Kauffmann v. Yoskowitz, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 94,532, at 93,399-402 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 1989).
247. Kauffmann, 1990 WL 300795, at *1-2.
248. Id. at *2. In an earlier decision, the same court found that the allega-
tions in the plaintiff's complaint were sufficient to meet the requirements for a
RICO pattern. Id.; Kauffinann v. Yoskowitz, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) V 94,532, at 93,404-05 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 1989).
249. Kauffmann, 1990 WL 300795, at *2.
250. 735 F. Supp. 903 (C.D. Ill. 1990).




255. Id. It appears that the Beck court erred in considering the facial valid-
ity of the pattern requirement because no first amendment issues appear to have
been involved in the case. Id. The Supreme Court has noted that a defendant
does not have standing to challenge a statute as unconstitutionally vague on its
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[T]he mere fact that an issue has been frequently litigated does
not prove its unconstitutional vagueness, nor does disagree-
ment among the various circuits. Even further, the fact that
RICO gives rise to legal and factual complications cannot make
the statute unconstitutional unless the Court is willing to de-
clare that the antitrust laws, the conspiracy laws, and other laws
which give rise to similar complications are unconstitutional.256
After reviewing a number of pre-Northwestern Bell decisions in which
challenges to RICO on vagueness grounds had been rejected, the court
then rejected the argument that RICO was vague on its face.2 57 Next,
the Beck court rejected the defendants' argument that they could not
have been expected to know that their activities would constitute a pat-
tern.258 Accordingly, the court held that RICO was not vague as applied
in this case.259
In Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Munnis,260 the plaintiff tire manufac-
turer brought a civil RICO action against "three of its affiliated dealers,
a number of the dealers' individual employees, and two of its own em-
ployees [for] submitting thousands of false warranty claims to [the plain-
tiff] over a period of twelve to fifteen years." 26' The defendants argued
that RICO's pattern requirement was unconstitutionally vague. 26 2 In
ruling on defendants' motions to dismiss, the court noted that no first
amendment considerations were involved and, therefore, the court lim-
ited its inquiry to whether the pattern requirement was vague as applied
to the defendants in the particular case. 263 The court then pointed out
that the plaintiff had alleged "thousands of illegal acts, continuing over
many years" and concluded that the plaintiff had met its burden of
pleading "whatever degree of 'continuity' or 'relationship'" was
required. 264
ii. Firestone v. Galbreath
Firestone v. Galbreath265 has the distinction of being the only case in
which a federal court has held RICO's pattern requirement unconstitu-
face unless first amendment considerations are involved. See New York v. Fer-
ber, 458 U.S. 747, 767-69 (1982).
256. Beck, 735 F. Supp. at 906.
257. Id
258. Id. at 906-07.
259. Id. at 907.
260. CIV. A. Nos. 89-2690, 89-4584, 1990 WL 45367 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 12,
1990).
261. Id at *1.
262. Id. at *7.
263. Id.
264. Id. at *8.
265. 747 F. Supp. 1556 (S.D. Ohio 1990).
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tionally vague. 266 The Firestone plaintiffs were beneficiaries of a trust
that was a residuary beneficiary of their grandmother's estate. 267 The
plaintiffs "[sought] to recover assets from the defendants which [the
plaintiffs] claim[ed] should have been included in the estate. ' 268 The
defendants challenged RICO's constitutionality in their motions to
dismiss.269
In FirestoneJudge Graham began his analysis of the constitutionality
of RICO's pattern requirement by noting that "a dispute between family
members concerning whether certain property should have remained in
a relative's estate" was "in all likelihood far removed from the typical
situations which Congress envisioned as being within RICO's scope of
coverage." 270 Judge Graham then commented that, if RICO's pattern
requirement were narrowly interpreted, the allegations in the complaint
might be insufficient to establish a pattern. 271 Next, Judge Graham
characterized the defendants' acts as "isolated and sporadic." 272
Having found that the defendants' acts were isolated and sporadic,
Judge Graham did not need to address the constitutional issue in order
to decide the case. The Supreme Court expressly provided in both
Sedima and Northwestern Bell that isolated and sporadic activity would
never form a pattern. 273 Nevertheless, Judge Graham proceeded to
opine that "persons of ordinary intelligence in defendant's [sic] situa-
tion would not have had adequate notice that [their activities] consti-
tuted a 'pattern of racketeering activity' under RICO."'274 Then, rather
than avoiding the constitutional issue, Judge Graham held that RICO
was unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendants. 275 Further-
more, instead of ceasing his analysis at that point, Judge Graham inex-
plicably proceeded to state: "This court is also persuaded to agree with
Justice Scalia's suggestion that the 'pattern' requirement is unconstitu-
266. Id. at 1581.
267. Id. at 1561-62.
268. Id. at 1563.
269. Id. at 1562.
270. Id. at 1581.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985)("The legislative history supports the view that two isolated acts of racketeering
activity do not constitute a pattern. As the Senate Report explained: 'The target
of [RICO] is thus not sporadic activity.' " (quoting S. REP. No. 617, supra note 25,
at 158 (alteration by Court) (emphasis added)); HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 492 F.2d 229, 239 (1989) ("A pattern is not formed by 'sporadic activ-
ity,' and a person 'cannot be subjected to the sanctions of [RICO] simply for
committing two widely separated and isolated criminal offenses.'" (quoting S.
REP. No. 617, supra note 25, at 158, 116 CONG. REC. 18,940 (1970) (Statement of
Senator McClellan))).
274. Firestone, 747 F. Supp. at 1581.
275. Id.
1740 [Vol. 36: p. 1697
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tionally vague as written." '276
Well-established Supreme Court jurisprudence dictates that courts
should never decide a constitutional issue unless its resolution is neces-
sary to decide the case. 277 Similarly, it is also well established that, un-
less first amendment considerations are involved, a defendant may only
challenge the constitutionality of a statute "as applied" to his particular
circumstances. 278 Judge Graham disregarded both of these principles.
Judge Graham unnecessarily considered the constitutionality of RICO's
pattern requirement even though he could easily have disposed of the
RICO claims on non-constitutional grounds. Furthermore, Judge Gra-
ham improperly considered the facial validity of RICO's pattern require-
ment in a case in which no first amendment considerations were
involved.
At present, Judge Graham's decision in Firestone stands alone.
Other courts that have considered the constitutionality of the pattern
requirement after Firestone have expressly declined to follow Judge Gra-
ham's lead. 27 9
IV. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS To CLARIFY THE PATTERN REQUIREMENT
In Northwestern Bell,2 80 the Supreme Court noted that further devel-
opment of the pattern requirement would have to "await future cases,
absent a decision by Congress to revisit RICO to provide clearer guidance as to the
Act's intended scope. "28 1 In the years that have followed, some members
276. Id
277. Under what is known as the Ashwander Doctrine, the Court avoids de-
ciding constitutional questions whenever it can decide a case on non-constitu-
tional grounds. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 341
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 154-55 (1951) (Federal courts "do not review issues,
especially constitutional issues, until they have to."); see, e.g., VSA v. Von Weise
Gear Co., 769 F. Supp. 1080, 1085 n.13 (E.D. Mo. 1991) ("Because, we hold
that plaintiffs failed to state a claim under RICO we need not reach the constitu-
tional issue."); Princeton Economics Group, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
768 F. Supp. 1 101, 1108 nA (D.N.J. 1991) ("Because the [defendant's] motion is
granted on an alternative basis, it is not necessary to address the issue as to
whether RICO is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of this case.").
278. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767 (1982) ("The traditional rule is
that a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied may not chal-
lenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitu-
tionally to others in situations not before the Court."); United States v. Mazurie,
419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975) ("It is well established that vagueness challenges to
statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in
the light of the facts of the case at hand.").
279. See, e.g., Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Mutual Trading Corp., 749 F.
Supp. 869, 874 (N.D. I1. 1990) ("We decline to follow Firestone's lead, and find
RICO's pattern requirement constitutional.... ."); see also United States v. Eisen-
berg, 773 F. Supp. 662, 731 (D.N.J. 1991) (acknowledging, but not following,
Firestone decision).
280. 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
281. Id. at 243 (emphasis added).
1991] COMMENT 1741
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of Congress have attempted to provide that "clearer guidance."2 8 2 Nev-
ertheless, no legislative amendment to RICO's pattern requirement has
been enacted to date. Furthermore, the bill currently pending in the
House of Representatives would do nothing to clarify the pattern re-
quirement and would inject uncertainty where none presently exists.
House Bill No. 1717 (Bill 1717)283 was purportedly introduced, in
part, to "tighten up" RICO's pattern requirement.28 4 Despite its stated
goal, however, Bill 1717's two proposed amendments to the pattern re-
quirement would not clarify the meaning of "pattern of racketeering."
First, Bill 1717 would codify the Supreme Court's existing continuity
and relationship requirements for a RICO pattern. 28 5 Because con-
tinuity and relationship are already required, however, this amendment
would do nothing to clarify the pattern requirement.
Second, Bill 1717 would provide that a pattern requires acts from at
least two separate "episodes. '2 86 This multiple episode requirement is
intended to codify an existing self-imposed guideline of the Department
ofJustice for RICO prosecutions. 28 7 While the bill does not define "ep-
isode," the Department of Justice's RICO Manual uses the term "epi-
sode" interchangeably with the term "scheme." 28 8 The Supreme Court
has already noted that a multiple-scheme approach that does not contain
a clear definition of the term "scheme" does not clarify the pattern re-
quirement, and may actually make the pattern requirement more
vague.2 8 9 Finally, not only would Bill 1717 fail to add clarity to the pat-
tern requirement, it would also create vagueness where none now exists
282. See, e.g. H.R. 1046, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); S. 438, 101st Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1989); S. 1523, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); H.R. 5445, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1986).
283. H.R. 1717, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
284. 137 CONG. REc. E1219 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 1991) (statement of Rep.
Hughes).
285. H.R. 1717, supra note 283, § 2; see also 137 CONG. REC. E1219 (daily
ed. Apr. 11, 1991) (statement of Rep. Hughes). For a discussion of the con-
tinuity and relationship test, see supra notes 62-84 and accompanying text.
286. H.R. 1717, supra note 283, § 2.
287. 137 CONG. REC. E1219 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 1991) (statement of Rep.
Hughes); see RICO MANUAL, supra note 15, at 63, reprinted in THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE MANUAL 9-2176.85 to .101 (P-H 1991) ("A proposed RICO count will
not be approved that contains more than one predicate act arising from a single
criminal episode.").
288. See, e.g., RICO MANUAL, supra note 15, at 56-59 (noting that the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit had declined to find pattern with-
out multiple schemes or episodes, but decision was overruled by Supreme
Court).
289. HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 241 n.3 (1989)
("Nor does the multiple scheme approach to identifying continuing criminal
conduct have the advantage of lessening the uncertainty inherent in RICO"s
pattern component, for' "scheme" is hardly a self-defining term.'... [W]e pre-
fer to confront these problems directly, not 'by introducing a new and perhaps
more amorphous concept into the analysis' that has no basis in text or legislative
history." (quoting Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat'l State, 832 F.2d
[Vol. 36: p. 16971742
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by injecting amorphous and undefined concepts into other sections of
the RICO statute.290
V. STATE ANTI-RACKETEERING LAws
The federal RICO statute, as interpreted by the Supreme Court,
defines pattern as two or more acts occurring within a specified time
frame that are both related and continuous.2 9 1 The vast majority of
states that have enacted anti-racketeering laws have modeled their state
statutes after the federal RICO statute. Thus, most state anti-racketeer-
ing statutes also contain pattern requirements. 2 92
Most states that have enacted anti-racketeering statutes containing
pattern requirements have simplified the task of interpreting their pat-
tern requirements by adopting language that provides what pattern
"means" rather than what pattern "requires.1 29 3 In the majority of
36, 39 (3rd. Cir. 1987))); see also Kelley, supra note 65, at 348-49 (arguing that
"episode" is an inherently unclear term).
290. H.R. 1717, supra note 283, § 3. In an attempt to prevent the abuse of
RICO by civil plaintiffs, Bill 1717 proposes the following new requirement be
added to the civil remedy provision:
This subsection is an extraordinary civil remedy and may only be used
against a defendant who was a major participant, either directly or as an
aider and abettor . in egregious criminal conduct responsible for a
significant injury to the plaintiff.
Id. (emphasis added). Bill 1717 would not explain what is meant by the terms
"major," or "significant." Bill 1717 would define "egregious" as follows:
For the purposes of this subsection, the term "egregious conduct"
means a pattern of criminal conduct which was an integral part of ongo-
ing racketeering activities and which was characterized by a combina-
tion of aggravating circumstances that renders [sic] the defendant's
conduct more reprehensible than the minimum conduct necessary to sus-
tain a violation of section 1962 of this title.
Id. (emphasis added). This collection of undefined and nebulous terms cannot
help but inject vagueness.
291. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989)
("Congress[] inten(ded] that to prove a pattern of racketeering activity a plain-
tiff or prosecutor must show that the racketeering predicates are related, and
that they amount to or pose a threat to continued criminal activity.") For a dis-
cussion of the requirements of relatedness and continuity for a patter under fed-
eral RICO, see supra notes 62-84 and accompanying text.
292. But see ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2301 to -2317 (1989 & Supp.
1991) (no pattern requirement); HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 842-1 to -12 (1985 & Supp.
1991) (same); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 506.120 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990)
(same); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 7-15-1 to -11 (1985) (same); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§§ 71.01-71.05 (Vernon 1989 & Supp. 1992) (same); see also NEv. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 207.390 (Michie 1986) (" '[r]acketeering activity' means engaging in at
least two crimes related to racketeering that have the same or similar pattern,
intents, results, accomplices victims or methods of commission, or are otherwise
interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents, if at
least one of the incidents occurred after July 1, 1983, and the last of the inci-
dents occurred within 5 years after a prior commission of a crime related to
raccketeering."; "pattern" not defined, however).
293. A few states, however, have chosen to adopt statutes similar to federal
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these statutes, the pattern requirements define a pattern as two or more
related predicate acts that occur within a specified time frame.2 94 One
RICO in that they provide what pattern "requires." See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5)
(1988) (" 'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at least two acts of racketeer-
ing activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the
last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment)
after the commision of a prior act of racketeering activity); NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:41-1(d) (West 1982) (" 'Pattern of racketeering activity' requires (1) En-
gaging in at least two incidents of racketeering conduct one of which shall have
occurred after the effective date of this act and the last of which shall have oc-
curred within 10 years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after a prior inci-
dent of racketeering activity; and (2) A showing that the incidents of
racketeering activity embrace criminal conduct that has either the same or simi-
lar purposes, results, participants or victims or methods of commission or are
otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated inci-
dents."); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-125(d) (West 1988) (" 'Pattern of racketeering
activity' requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred
after the effective date of this act and the last of which occurred within 10 years
(excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of
racketeering activity." (Casino Control Act)); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-
01(2) (d) (Supp. 1991) (" 'Pattern of racketeering activity' requires at least two
acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred afterJuly 8, 1987 and the last
of which occurred within ten years, excluding any period of imprisonment, after
the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity.").
294. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-17-103(3) (" 'Pattern of racketeering activ-
ity' means engaging in at least two acts of racketeering activity which are related
to the conduct of the enterprise, if at least one of such acts occurred in this state
after July 1, 198 1, and if the last of such acts occurred within ten years (exclud-
ing any period of imprisonment) after a prior act of racketeering activity.");
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-394(e) (West 1985) ("'Pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity' means engaging in at least two incidents of racketeering activity that have
the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims or methods of com-
mission or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics, including
a nexus to the same enterprise, and are not isolated incidents, provided the lat-
ter or last of such incidents occured after October 1, 1982, and within five years
after a prior incident of racketeering activity."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 895.02(4)
(West Supp. 1992) (" 'Pattern of racketeering activity' means engaging in at
least two incidents of racketeering conduct that have the same or similar intents,
results, accomplices, victims, or methods of commission or that otherwise are
interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents, pro-
vided at least one of such incidents occurred after the effective date of this act
and that the last of such incidents occurred within five years after a prior inci-
dent of racketeering conduct."); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-14-3(8) (Supp. 1991)
(" 'Pattern of racketeering activity' means engaging in at least two incidents of
racketeering activity that have the same or similar intents, results, accomplices,
victims, or methods of commission or otherwise are interrelated by distinguish-
ing characteristics and are not isolated incidents, provided at least one of such
incidents occurred afterJuly 1, 1980, and that the last of such incidents occurred
within four years, excluding any periods of imprisonment, after the commission
of a prior incident of racketeering activity."); IDAHO CODE § 18-7803(d) (1987)(" 'Pattern of racketeering activity' means engaging in at least two (2) incidents
of racketeering conduct that have the same or similar intents, results, accom-
plices, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by dis-
tinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents, provided at least one
(1) of such incidents occurred after the effective date of this act and that the last
of such incidents occurred within five (5) years after a prior incident of racke-
48
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state's pattern requirement also specifies that the related predicate acts
must be connected with "organized crime." 2 95 Four state statutes em-
teering conduct.") IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-6-1 (West 1986) (" 'Pattern of racke-
teering activity' means engaging in at least two (2) incidents of racketeering
activity that have the same or similar intent, result, accomplice, victim, or
method of commission, or that are otherwise interrelated by distinguishing char-
acteristics [sic] that are not isolated incidents. However, the incidents are a pat-
tern of racketeering only if at least one (1) of the incidents occurred after August
31, 1980, and if the last of the incidents occurred within five (5) years after a
prior incident of racketeering activity."); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1352(C)
(West Supp. 1992) ("'Pattern of drug racketeering activity' means engaging in
at least two incidents of drug racketeering activity that have the same or similar
intents, results, principals, victims, or methods of commission or otherwise are
interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents, pro-
vided at least one of such incidents occurs after the effective date of this Act and
that the last of such incidents occurs within five years after a prior incident of
drug racketeering activity."); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-43-3(d) (Supp. 1989)
(" 'Pattern of racketeering activity' means engaging in at least two (2) incidents
of racketeering conduct that have the same or similar intents, results, accom-
plices, victims, or methods of commission or otherwise are interrelated by dis-
tinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents, provided at least one
(1) of such incidents occurred after the effective date of this chapter and that the
last of such incidents occurred within five (5) years after a prior incident of rack-
eteering conduct."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-3(b) (1990) (" 'Pattern of racketeer-
ing activity' means engaging in at least two incidents of racketeering activity that
have the same or similar purposes, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of
commission or otherwise are interrelated by distiguishing characteristics and are
not isolated and unrelated incidents, provided at least one of such incidents
occurred after October 1, 1986, and that at least one other of such incidents
occurred within a four-year period of time of the other, excluding any periods of
inprisonment, after the commission of a prior incident of racketeering activ-
ity."); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.715(4) (1990) (" 'Pattern of racketeering activity'
means engaging in at least two incidents of racketeering activity that have the
same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of commission
or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics, including a nexus
to the same enterprise, and are not isolated incidents, provided at least one of
such incidents occurred after November 1, 1981, and that the last of such inci-
dents occurrred within five years after a prior incident of racketeering activity.");
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-12-203(6) (1991) (" 'Pattern of racketeering activity'
means engaging in at least two (2) incidents of racketeering conduct that have
the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of commis-
sion or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not
isolated incidents; provided, that at least one (1) of such incidents occurred after
July 1, 1986, and that the last of such incidents occurred within two (2) years
after a prior incident of racketeering conduct."); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.82.010(15) (1988) (" 'Pattern of criminal profiteering activity' means en-
gaging in at least three acts of criminal profiteering, one of which occurred after
July 1, 1985, and the last of which occurred within five years, excluding any pe-
riod of inprisonment, after the commission of the earliest act of criminal profi-
teering. In order to constitute a pattern, the three acts must have the same or
similar intent, results, accomplices, principals, victims, or methods of commis-
sion, or be otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics including a
nexus to the same enterprise, and must not be isolated events." (emphasis
added)).
295. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.2(b) (West 1988) (" 'Pattern of criminal
profiteering activity' means engaging in at least two incidents of criminal profi-
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ploy pattern requirements which provide that if two or more predicate
acts are too closely related, they will be treated as a single act.29 6 Two
other state pattern requirements provide that, if the acts are not related
to a common scheme, plan or purpose, a pattern may still exist if the
participants have the mental capacity required for the predicate acts and
are associated with the criminal enterprise. 29 7
teering, as defined by this act, which meet the following requirements: (1) Have
the same or similar purpose, result, principals, victims or methods of commis-
sion, or are otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics [;j (2) Are
not isolated events [; and] (3) Were committed as criminal activity of organized
crime.").
296. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11. § 1502(5) (1987) (" 'Pattern of racketeer-
ing activity' shall mean 2 or more incidents of conduct: a. That: 1. Constitute
racketeering activity; 2. Are related to the affairs of the enterprise; 8. Are not so
closely related to each other and connected in point of time and place that they
constitute a single event; and b. Where: 1. At least 1 of the incidents of con-
duct occurred afterjuly 9, 1986; 2. The last incident of conduct occurred within
10 years after a prior occassion of conduct . . . ."); OnIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2923.31(E) (Anderson Supp. 1991) ("'Pattern of corrupt activity' means two
or more incidents of corrupt activity, whether or not there has been a prior con-
viction, that are related to the affairs of the same enterprise, are not isolated, and
are not so closely related to each other and connected in time and place that
they constitute a single event. At least one of the incidents forming the pattern
shall occur on or after January 1, 1986. Unless any incident was an aggravated
murder or murder, the last of the incidents forming the pattern shall occur
within six years after the commission of any prior incident forming the pattern,
excluding any period of inprisonment served by any person engaging in the cor-
rupt activity."); OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1402(5) (West Supp. 1992) (" 'Pat-
tern of racketeering activity' means two or more occasions of conduct: a. that
include each of the following: (1) constitute racketeering activity, (2) are re-
lated to the affairs of the enterprise, (3) are not isolated, (4) are not so closely
related to each other and connected in point of time and place that they consti-
tute a single event, and b. where each of the following is present: (1) at least
one of the occasions of conduct occurred after November 1, 1988, (2) the last of
the occasions of conduct occurred within three (3) years, excluding any period
of imprisonment served by the person engaging in the conduct, of a prior occa-
sion of conduct ..... ); see also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 946.82(3) (West Supp. 1991)
(" 'Pattern of racketeering activity' means engaging in at least 3 incidents of
racketeering activity that that the same or similar intents, results, accomplices,
victims or methods of commission or otherwise are interrelated by distinguish-
ing characteristics, provided at least one of the incidents occurred after April 27,
1982 and that the last of the incidents occurred within 7 years after the first
incident of racketeering activity. Acts occuring at the same time and place which
may form the basis for crimes punishable under more than one statutory provi-
sion may count for only one incident of racketeering activity." (emphasis
added)).
297. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.902(6) (West Supp. 1992) (" 'Pattern of
criminal activity' means conduct constituting three or more criminal acts that: (1)
were committed within ten years of the commencement of the criminal proceed-
ing; (2) are neither isolated incidents, nor so closely related and connected in
point of time or circumstance of commission as to constitute a single criminal
offense; and (3) were either: (i) related to one another through a common
scheme or plan or shared criminal purpose or (ii) committed, solicited, re-
quested, importuned, or intentionally aided by persons acting with the mental
culpability required for the commission of the criminal acts and associated with
1746 (Vol. 36: p. 1697
50
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 6 [1991], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol36/iss6/8
1991] COMMENT 1747
The above statutes require that the predicate acts be related. A few
state statutes, however, employ pattern requirements that do not re-
quire a relationship among the predicate acts. One state's pattern re-
quirement omits any reference to a relationship and simply provides
that pattern "refers to" two or more specified acts within a specified
time frame.2 98 Another state statute omits any reference to a relation-
ship and defines pattern as two or more specified acts that are commit-
ted "with the intent of accomplishing [specified] prohibited
activities." 29 9 Finally, one state's pattern requirement defines pattern as
three related "episodes" that demonstrate "continuing unlawful
conduct."3 00
As the preceding discussion reveals, most pattern definitions in
state anti-racketeering statutes require that the predicate acts be related
and that the acts occur within a specified time frame, but only one state
statute expressly mentions continuity.30 ' In many instances, however,
or in an enterprise involved in these activities." (emphasis added)); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 460.10(4) (McKinney 1989) (" 'Pattern of criminal activity' means con-
duct engaged in by persons charged in an enterprise corruption count constitut-
ing three or more criminal acts that: (a) were committed within ten years of the
commencement of the criminal action; (b) are neither isolated incidents, nor so
closely related and connected in point in time or circumstance of commission as
to constitute a criminal offense or criminal transaction.. .; and (c) are either: (i)
related to one another through a common scheme or plan or (ii) were commit-
ted, solicited, requested, importuned or intentionally aided by persons acting
with the mental culpability required for the commission thereof and associated
with or in the criminal enterprise." (emphasis added)).
298. See 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 911(h) (4) (Purdon 1983) (" 'Pattern of
racketeering activity' refers to a course of conduct requiring two or more acts of
racketeering activity one of which occurred after the effective date of this sec-
tion." (emphasis added)); see also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 561/2, para. 1653(b) (Smith-
Hurd 1985) (" 'Pattern of narcotics activity' means 2 or more acts of narcotics
activity of which at least 2 such acts were committed within 5 years of each other.
At least one of those acts of narcotics activity must have been committed after
the effective date of this Act and at least one of such acts shall be or shall have
been punishable as a ... felony." (emphasis added)).
299. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-42-3(D) (1989) (" 'pattern of racketeering
activity' means engaging in at least two incidents of racketeering with the intent
of accomplishing any of the prohibited activities . . .; provided at least one of
such incidents occurred after the effetive date of [this act] and the last of which
occurred within five years after the commission of a prior incident of
racketeering.")
300. See UTAH CODE. UNANN. § 76-10-1602(2) (Michie 1990) (" 'Pattern of
unlawful activity' means engaging in conduct which constitutes the commission
of at least three episodes of unlawful activity, which episodes are not isolated,
but have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods
of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics.
Taken together, these episodes shall demonstrate continuing unlawful conduct
and be related to each other or to the enterprise. At least one of the episodes
compromising a pattern of unlawful activity shall have occurred after July 3 1,
1981. The most recent act constituting part of a pattern of unlawful activity as
defined by this part shall have occurred within five years of the commission of
the next preceding act alleged as part of the pattern.").
301. See id.
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the state pattern definition specifies that the predicate acts may not be
"isolated." 302 Lack of isolation is arguably the functional equivalent of
continuity.30 3 Accordingly, a persuasive argument may be made that
many state pattern definitions require both continuity and relationship
and, therefore, are essentially identical to the federal pattern require-
ment in terms of clarity.
Because of the similarity between many state pattern requirements
and the pattern requirement in the federal RICO statute, it is instructive
to consider the experiences of those states in enforcing their anti-racke-
teering statutes. Few void-for-vagueness challenges have been made to
the pattern requirements in state anti-racketeering laws patterned after
the federal RICO statute 30 4 In each of those cases, the challenge has
been rejected and the statute has been found constitutional. 30 5
302. See statutes cited supra notes 294-99.
303. Some commentators contend that continuity and lack of isolation are
equivalent concepts. See Goldsmith, RICO and "Pattern:" The Search for "Con-
tinuity Plus Relationship," 73 CORNELL L. REV. 971, 1000 n.183 (1987); Note, Is
This the End of RICO, supra note 17, at 1147 & n.254. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, has apparently rejected such an interpretation of the word "isolated." In
Northwestern Bell, the Supreme Court discussed a pattern definition that required
that the predicate acts "not [be] isolated events." 492 U.S. 240 (quoting 18
U.S.C. 3575(e) (1982) (repealed (1987)). Despite the inclusion of the require-
ment that the acts not be isolated, the Court stated that the definition "defined
[the] pattern requirement solely in terms of the relationship of the defendant's
criminal acts to one another." Id. Thus, the Court did not even mention that
pattern definition when discussing the requirement of continuity. Id. at 240-43.
Contrary to the Court's discussion in Northwestern Bell, however, some lower fed-
eral courts have recently treated lack of isolation and continuity as equivalent
concepts. See Dolsky v. Johnson, Civ. A. No. 90-1937, 1991 WL 3540, at *5
(E.D. Pa.Jan. 9, 1991) (mem.) (finding that defendant's acts were not continuous
after noting that they were "isolated business transactions"); Valley Forge Ins
Co. v. Colello, No. 89 C 9016, 1990 WL 141461, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20,
1990) (mem.) ("The Supreme Court has found that .. .before a 'pattern of
racketeering' exists... the predicate acts of racketeering must be continuous,
i.e. not sporadic or isolated ....").
304. But see Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46 (1989) (re-
jecting constitutional challenge to pattern requirement in Indiana's anti-racke-
teering statute); Carlson v. State, 405 So. 2d 173, 174 (Fla. 1981) (rejecting
defendant's contention that pattern requirement in state statute was unconstitu-
tionally vague); Bowden v. State, 402 So. 2d 1173, 1174 (Fla. 1980) (same);
Moorhead v. State, 383 So. 2d 629, 630-31 (Fla. 1980) (same); Chancey v. State,
349 S.E.2d 717, 729-30 (Ga. 1986) (same); Flinn v. State, 563 N.E.2d 536, 540-
41 (Ind. 1990) (same); State v. Passante, 225 N.J. Super. 439, 446-49, 542 A.2d
952, 955-57 (Law. Div. 1987) (same); State v. Johnson, 105 N.M. 63, 69, 728
P.2d 473,480 (1986) (same); People v. Capaldo, 572 N.Y.S.2d 989, 991-92 (Sup.
Ct. 1991) (same); Ohio v. Thrower, 62 Ohio App. 3d 359, 372-74, 575 N.W.2d
863, 872-74 (1989) (same); State v. Romig, 73 Or. App. 780, 788, 700 P.2d 293,
298 (1985) (same); State v. Thompson, 751 P.2d 805, 815 (Utah App. 1988)
(same).
305. See cases cited supra note 304.
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The Supreme Court will likely confront a constitutional challenge to
RICO's pattern requirement in the next few years.30 6 Commentators
disagree on what the Court will or should decide when ultimately faced
with that challenge.30 7 The remainder of this Comment draws on the
material already discussed to predict the outcome of such a challenge.
Any prediction of the Supreme Court's ruling on a constitutional
challenge to RICO's pattern requirement must begin with the recogni-
tion of two factors that may strongly influence the Court. First, RICO is
afederal statute. The Court affords federal statutes a strong presumption
of validity308 and, to the extent possible, will interpret federal statutes to
avoid any constitutional infirmity.309 Second, the number of conserva-
tive Justices on the Supreme Court is greater than at any time in recent
history. The more conservative the Court, the less likely that it will
strike down statutes, such as RICO, that are targeted at criminals.3 10
306. Professor Blakey, a drafter of RICO, acknowledges that it is "likely
that one or more district courts will hold RICO unconstitutionally vague" and
that "a panel of a court of appeal will thoughtlessly follow suit." Blakey, Is "Pat-
tern" Void for Vagueness?, CIVIL RICO REP. (BNA), Dec. 12, 1989, at 7, col. 2.
Indeed, one district court has already held RICO's pattern requirement "uncon-
stitutionally vague as written" in a case where the court was not even required to
address the issue. See Firestone v. Galbreath, 747 F. Supp. 1556, 1581 (S.D.
Ohio 1990). For a discussion of Firestone, see supra notes 265-79 and accompany-
ing text.
307. See, e.g., Blakey, supra note 306, at 7, col. 2 (arguing that RICO's pat-
tern requirement is not unconstitutionally vague); Freeman & McSlarrow, supra
note 88, at 1010 (arguing that RICO's pattern requirement is unconstitutionally
vague); Rakoff, supra note 116, at 3, col. I (arguing that RICO's pattern require-
ment is unconstitutionally vague); Note, Void For Vagueness, supra note 17 at 527
(arguing that RICO's pattern requirement is not unconstitutionally vague).
308. For a discussion of the strong presumption of validity afforded to fed-
eral statutes, see supra note 103 and accompanying text.
309. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's preference for narrowing,
rather than invalidating federal statutes, see supra notes 104-07 and accompany-
ing text.
310. See Lewis, A Rehearsed Thomas Is Set for Hearings, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9,
1991, at A.12 col. 4 ('IT]he Court has become more and more conservative,
generally showing greater deference to government and less tolerance of crimi-
nal defendants while being more supportive of law-enforcement agencies and
increasingly skeptical of an expansive interpretation of the Constitution.");
Price, Marshall's Retirement Brings Cheers and Tears, Wash. Post, June 28, 1991, at
A10, col. 1 ("With one more conservative vote on the Supreme Court, the
criminals' lobby will be on the run." (statement of Richard Viguerie, Chairman
of United Conservatives of America)); Nightline: Supreme Court Justice Thurgood
Marshall Resigns (ABC television broadcast, June 27, 1991) ("Today's Supreme
Court is far more conservative, far less likely to strike down criminal laws and
public policies of legislatures or the Congress." (statement of reporter Jeff
Greenfield)), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ABCNEW File; see also Harnessing
the Power of the Bet: Wagering with the Government as a Mechanism for Social and Indi-
vidual Change, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 737, 814 (1991) ("We... are in a period of
increased threat to civil liberties, as more and more Americans seem willing to
trade away certain constitutional protections to enhance law enforcement efforts
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These two factors combine to provide RICO with an exceedingly strong
foundation from which to combat the present constitutional challenge.
When read in conjunction with the judicial gloss applied by the
Supreme Court in Northwestern Bell and Sedima, RICO's pattern require-
ment provides the guidance required by the void-for-vagueness doctrine
to: (1) citizens who must follow the statute; (2) police who must enforce
the statute; and (3) judges who must interpret the statute.3 1 1 First,
RICO's pattern requirement provides sufficient guidance that a con-
cerned citizen generally could determine whether or not her conduct
would constitute a pattern of racketeering. It is perhaps instructive to
consider this desire for guidance from the viewpoint of the hypothetical
concerned citizen of ordinary intelligence. As a starting point, this citi-
zen likely would be a criminal and necessarily would be contemplating
the commission of one or more crimes.3 1 2 The citizen would be con-
cerned with whether the crime that she was contemplating, when taken
in conjunction with her other crime(s), would constitute a pattern of
racketeering under RICO.
The Court has stated that crimes constitute a pattern of racketeer-
ing if they are both continuous and related.3 1 3 The Court has also ex-
plained what continuity and relationship mean in the context of
RICO.3 1 4 If the concerned citizen read the Court's discussion in North-
western Bell, or contacted her attorney, she could, in all likelihood, accu-
rately predict whether her contemplated conduct would constitute a
in the war on crime and drugs. And this threat is a serious one, given an increas-
ingly conservative Supreme Court." (footnote omitted)).
311. For a discussion of the functions served by the void-for vagueness doc-
trine, see supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
312. Thus, the question could also be phrased: "Would a criminal of ordi-
nary intelligence in the defendant's position know that if she commits another
crime she would have engaged in a pattern of racketeering." Phrasing the ques-
tion in this way highlights one reason that courts may not be overly sympathetic
to a defendant challenging RICO's pattern requirement-the challenger is ar-
guably a criminal.
Such a defendant is only arguably a criminal for two reasons. First, a de-
fendant can be found to have violated RICO without having been criminally con-
victed of the underlying predicate acts. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473
U.S. 479, 493 (1985) ("[A] prior-conviction requirement would be inconsistent
with Congress' underling policy concerns."). Second, the burden of proof in
civil RICO actions has been interpreted uniformly by the circuit courts of ap-
peals as "a preponderance of the evidence." See supra note 7 and accompanying
text; see also Sedima, 473 U.S. at 491 (stating that Court is "not at all convinced
that the predicate acts must be established beyond a reasonable doubt" in civil
RICO actions).
313. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989)("RICO's legislative history reveals Congress' intent that to prove a pattern of
racketeering activity a plaintiff or prosecutor must show that the racketeering
predicates are related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued
criminal activity.").
314. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's espousal of the continuity
plus relationship test, see supra notes 51, 62-84 and accompanying text.
1750
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pattern of racketeering under RICO. As a practical matter, however,
citizens generally do not consult the text of statutes before they act, nor
do they study judicial opinions. Moreover, in terms of importance, the
Court has stated that guidance to citizens is the least important of the
three functions served by the void-for-vagueness doctrine.315
A second, and more important, function of the void-for-vagueness
doctrine is to ensure that police receive necessary guidance so that they
properly enforce the statute.316 With regard to RICO, this function of
the doctrine necessarily centers on criminal applications of the statute
by the Department of Justice.3 17 The Department of Justice has pub-
lished stringent guidelines concerning the meaning of the pattern re-
quirement 318 and has established a mandatory review procedure to
ensure that these guidelines are applied properly and uniformly.31 9 The
Department of Justice would not have been able to draft meaningful
guidelines unless it had received sufficient guidance as to the meaning of
the pattern requirement. Furthermore, the rigorous application of these
guidelines ensures that RICO is not subject to the prosecutorial abuse
that the void-for-vagueness doctrine seeks to prevent.3 20
The third and final function of the void-for-vagueness doctrine is to
ensure that the statute provides sufficient guidance to the judiciary who
must interpret it.321 RICO's detractors focus on this function most fre-
315. For a discussion of the relative importance of the functions served by
the void-for-vagueness doctrine, see supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
Professor Blakey, one of the drafters of RICO, contends that defendants cannot
be heard to complain that they had no notice that their conduct violated RICO.
See Blakey, supra note 306, at 7, col. 2 ("A person convicted of RICO lost his
innocence when he violated the predicate offense. Accordingly, that person got
his vagueness 'bite' at that point. Complaining about RICO itself is asking for
'two bites' out of the 'vagueness apple.' ") Adherents to Prof. Blakey's position
view RICO as a penalty enhancing statute for which no notice is required. This
view ignores the fact that the defendant may have had notice that he was com-
miting a crime, but not that his acts constituted a pattern. See Note, Void For
Vagueness, supra note 17, at 520 (rejecting argument that defendant need not
receive notice that his conduct constituted a pattern).
316. For a discussion of the importance of the requirement that police re-
ceive adequate guidance, see supra note 91 and accompanying text.
317. Criminal action under RICO can only be brought by the government.
18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
318. For a discussion of the Department of Justice guidelines, see supra
notes 15, 124-26 and accompanying text.
319. For a discussion of the Department ofJustice's mandatory review pro-
cedure, see supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
320. But see Kelley, supra note 65 at 390 (arguing that very existence of guid-
lines reveals that Department ofJustice acknowledges that RICO fails to provide
required guidance); see also Freeman & McSlarrow, supra note 88 at 1008 (argu-
ing that Department of Justice guidelines cannot mitigate vagueness in RICO)
For a discussion of how rigorous application of the Department ofJustice guide-
lines reduces the risk of frivolous prosecutions, see supra notes 124-26 and ac-
companying text.
321. For a discussion of the importance that a statute provide guidance to
1991] COMMENT 1751
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quently in arguing that the statute's pattern requirement is unconstitu-
tionally vague.3 2 2 The almost uniform rejection of void-for-vagueness
challenges to RICO's pattern requirement by federal courts provides
one of the most forceful arguments that RICO does provide sufficient
guidance to the judiciary.32 3 Similarly, the very fact that the Court was
able to explain the meaning of "pattern" demonstrates that the statute
provided the Court with guidance as to the proper interpretation of the
pattern requirement. Furthermore, the explanation of pattern by the
majority in Northwestern Bell serves as additional guidance to the lower
courts.
Additional support for the position that the Supreme Court ulti-
mately will hold RICO's pattern requirement constitutional may be
found in a myriad of sources. First, over a decade before the Court's
decisions in Sedima and Northwestern Bell, lower federal courts already had
rejected constitutional challenges to RICO's pattern requirement.3 24
Those lower courts recognized that, while the pattern requirement was
flexible, it was not unconstitutionally vague. Only after Justice Scalia
invited a constitutional challenge to RICO's pattern requirement in his
Northwestern Bell concurrence did RICO's detractors resurrect the al-
ready discredited argument that the statute's definition of pattern was
unconstitutionally vague. Despite Justice Scalia's protestations to the
contrary,3 25 however, the Court's decisions in Sedima and Northwestern
Bell have made RICO's pattern requirement more, rather than less,
clear. Thus, the pattern requirement that exists today is clearer than it
was when the early challenges to its constitutionality were uniformly
rejected. 3 26
Support for the constitutionality of the pattern requirement may
also be found in the experience of state courts with statutes that are
modeled after RICO. As a result of the continuity and relationship re-
quirements expressed by the Court in Sedima and Northwestern Bell,
RICO's pattern requirement now is virtually identical to those in many
state anti-racketeering statutes.3 27 The constitutionality of the pattern
the judiciary charged with its interpretation, see supra note 89 and accompanying
text.
322. See, e.g., Kelley, supra note 65, at 345-70, 402 (arguing that RICO is
unconstitutionally vague due to differing interpretations of pattern requirement
by circuit courts of appeals).
323. For cases rejecting the argument that RICO's pattern requirement is
unconstitutionally vague, see supra notes 151-264 and accompanying text.
324. For a discussion of pre-Northwestern Bell cases in which federal courts
rejected constitutional challenges to RICO's pattern requirement, see supra
notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
325. See Northwestern Bell, 492 U.S. at 255 ("It seems to me [the majority's
explanation of pattern] increases rather than removes the vagueness.").
326. But see Firestone v. Galbreath, 747 F. Supp. 1556, 1581 (S.D. Ohio
1990) (holding RICO unconstitutional on its face and as applied). For a discus-
sion of the facts of Firestone, see supra notes 265-79 and accompanying text.
327. For a discussion of the similarity between RICO's pattern requirement
[Vol. 36: p. 16971752
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requirements in those state statutes has rarely, if ever, been chal-
lenged.3 28 The state courts that have addressed such challenges, much
like their federal counterparts, uniformly have rejected those chal-
lenges.3 2 9 The fact that state pattern requirements similar to that con-
tained in RICO rarely have been challenged and the fact that those state
courts that have considered constitutional challenges to pattern require-
ments similar to RICO have uniformily rejected such challenges bolster
the argument that RICO's pattern requirement is constitutional.
Those who argue that RICO's pattern requiement is vague premise
their arguments largely on Justice Scalia's cQncurrence in Northwestern
Bell.3 30 As several courts have noted, however, Justice Scalia's com-
ments were merely dicta.3 3 ' RICO's detractors also attempt to make
predictions based upon analogies between a constitutional challenge to
RICO's pattern requirement and cases in which the Supreme Court has
addressed vagueness challenges to other statutes.3 3 2 As discussed ear-
lier, to the extent that such predictions rely on Lanzetta or Fort Wayne, the
predictions are vulnerable to criticism. 3 "3 To the extent that such pre-
dictions rely on Northwestern Bell, they are inconclusive.3 3 4 Furthermore,
and the pattern requirements in a number of state anti-racketeering statutes, see
supra notes 292-305.
328. For cases where the constitutionality of state pattern requirements was
challenged, see supra note 304.
329. See cases cites supra note 304. But see Firestone v. Galbreath, 747 F.
Supp. 1556, 1581 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (holding RICO's pattern requirement
unconstitutional).
330. Northwestern Bell, 492 U.S. at 251 (Scalia, J., concurring).
331. See, e.g., Kauffmann v. Yoskowitz, 85 Civ. 8414 (PKL), 1990 WL
300795, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 190) ("[T]he court will not, based on the dicta of
a concurring Supreme Court Justice, and in the face of all existing case law, find
the civil RICO statute unconstitutional either on its face or as applied in the
instant action.").
332. See, e.g., Rakoff, supra note 116, at 3, col. 2 (prediction based on deci-
sions of current Justices on past vagueness challenge to state racketeering stat-
ute and on analogy to prior Supreme Court decision that word "gang" used in
state statute was unconstitutionally vague).
333. For a discussion of why the Supreme Court's decision in Fort Wayne is
not helpful in predicting the Court's decision if faced with a constitutional chal-
lenge to RICO's pattern requirement, see supra notes 130-37 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of why the Supreme Court's decision in Lanzetta is not
helpful in predictingthe Court's decision if faced with a constitutional challenge
to RICO's pattern requirement, see supra notes 115-29 and accompanying text.
334. The majority's decision in Northwestern Bell arguably indicates that Jus-
tices White, Blackmun and Stevens view RICO's pattern requirement as worka-
ble. Northwestern Bell, 492 U.S. at 232-43 (expounding on meaning of RICO's
pattern requirement; joined by Justices Marshall and Brennan who have since
retired and would not participate in any future decision on the constitutionality
of pattern requirement). On the other hand, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tices O'Connor and Kennedy joined a concurring opinion wherein Justice Scalia
professed that it is "beyond the Court" to ascertain the meaning of RICO's pat-
tern requirement. Id. at 255 (Scalia, J., concurring). The remaining members of
the Court, Justices Souter and Thomas have not yet sat on a case where RICO's
1991] COMMENT 1753
57
Moran: Is the Darling in Danger - Void For Vagueness - The Constitutiona
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
predictions that RICO's pattern requirement will be found unconstitu-
tional ignore the fact that the Court repeatedly has rejected vagueness
challenges to statutes containing terms that undoubtedly are no clearer
than RICO's pattern requirement.a35 Surely "pattern" is no less precise
a term than "ordinary" "reasonable" or "near. 3 3 6
RICO's detractors also argue that, even after Northwestern Bell, the
United States Courts of Appeals are not applying a uniform test for pat-
tern. 3 37 Due to this lack of a uniform test, the Court ultimately may be
called upon to resolve a split among the circuits as to the meaning of
pattern. It does not follow, however, that RICO's pattern requirement
is unconstitutionally vague simply because all circuits are not interpret-
ing that term identically. Resolving splits among the circuits is one of
the rudimentary functions served by the Supreme Court. 38 This author
suggests that the Court will resolve yet another split if ultimately faced
with conflicting interpretations of the pattern requirement among the
courts of appeals.
Finally, at least one commentator has suggested that RICO might
be unconstitutionally vague in its civil, but not in its criminal applica-
tions.3 3 9 Supporters of this position note that, in its civil applications,
RICO: (1) is more likely used in ways never intended by Congress;3 40
(2) is not generally subject to the check on discretion provided by the
Department of Justice's mandatory review procedure;3 4 1 (3) is more
pattern requirement was at issue. Thus, even if one were to accept that "vote-
counting" based on prior decisions was an accurate method for predicting the
Court's ultimate decision, no majority (five justices) of the present Court has
indicated that the pattern requirement is, or is not, unconstitutionally vague.
335. For examples of cases where the Supreme Court rejected vagueness
challenges to statutes that were no more clear than RICO, see infra note 338.
336. See cases cited supra note 93.
337. See, e.g. Kelley, supra note 65, at 401-02.
338. See, e.g., Cheek v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991) (resolving con-
flict among circuits over meaning of the word "willfully" as used in federal in-
come tax laws); United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974) (resolving
conflict among circuits as to whether phrase "Attorney General, or any Assistant
Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney General" in federal wire-
tap statute could be read to encompass Executive Assistant to Attorney Gen-
eral); see also Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590 (1958) (resolving conflict
among circuits as to whether phrase "Government of the United States" as used
in federal False Claims Act encompassed government corporations).
339. See Rakoff, supra note 116, at 6 col. 5 ("To be sure, a reasonable argu-
ment can be made that, despite the unity of the statutory language, RICO is
unconstitutionally vague only on the civil side .. "); see also Note, Is This the End
of RICO, supra note 17, at 1149-50 (disccussing possibility that Court would treat
civil and criminal cases differently if statute were ultimately held unconstitution-
ally vague).
340. See supra note 26.
341. For a discussion of the Department of Justice review procedure, see
supra notes 15, 124-26 and accompanying text.
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likely to involve first amendment concerns;3 4 2 and (4) is not subject to
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof required for crimi-
nal prosecutions.34 3 Nevertheless, because RICO must be construed
similarly in both its civil and criminal applications, the Court may not
find RICO unconstitutionally vague in its civil applications without also
finding the statute unconstitutionally vague in its criminal
applications.3 4 4
RICO's pattern requirement provides the guidance required by the
void-for-vagueness doctrine. In Northwestern Bell and Sedima, the Court
espoused a workable definition of "pattern" using accepted methods of
statutory interpretation. The continuity plus relationship test provides
RICO's pattern requirement with a judicial gloss sufficient to provide
guidance not only to those seeking to avoid violating the statute, but
also to officials charged with RICO's enforcement and to judges charged
with RICO's interpretation. Consequently, it is unlikely that the increas-
ingly conservative Supreme Court ultimately will hold that RICO's pat-
tern requirement is unconstitutionally vague in either its criminal or civil
applications.
VII. CONCLUSION
RICO's pattern requirement is not unconstitutionally vague. Any
vagueness that may have existed as to the meaning of the term "pattern"
was brought within acceptable constitutional levels as a result of the
Supreme Court's decisions in Sedima and Northwestern Bell. These deci-
sions clarified the meaning of "pattern" and implicitly acknowledged
that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague. If and when the Court
ultimately faces a constitutional challenge to the pattern requirement in
either a civil or criminal action, that challenge will be rejected.
ChristopherJ. Moran
342. For RICO cases involving first amendment concerns, see supra note
97.
343. For a discussion of the standards of proof in civil and criminal RICO
actions, see supra note 7.
344. For a discussion of the requirement that statutes with both civil and
criminal applications be contrued similarly in both settings, see supra note 102.
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